NC0003425_Exhibit 13_20160531

EXHIBIT 13
EPA Amicus Brief - Hawaii Wildlife Fund
US Court of Appeals
No. 15-17447.
for the Ninth Circuit
May 31, 2016

No. 15-17447
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
HAWAII WILDLIFE FUND; SIERRA CLUB-MAUI GROUP;
SURFRIDER FOUNDATION; WEST MAUI
PRESERVATION ASSOCIATION,
Plaintiffs -Appe Ilees,
V.
COUNTY OF MAUI,
Defendant -Appellant.
On Appeal from the U.S. District Court, Dist. of Hawaii
No. 12-cv-198, Hon. Susan Oki Mollway, District Judge
BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES AS AMICUS CURIAE
IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS -APPELLEES
OF COUNSEL:
KARYN WENDELOWSKI
U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency
Office of General Counsel
Washington, D.C.
JOHN C. CRUDEN
Assistant Attorney General
AARON P. AVILA
R. JUSTIN SMITH
FREDERICK H. TURNER
Attorneys, U.S. Dep't of Justice
Env't & Natural Resources Div.
P.O. Box 7415
Washington, DC 20044
[phone]
[e-mail]

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TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES.................................................................... ill
INTEREST OF THE UNITED STATES..................................................1
ISSUES PRESENTED..............................................................................2
STATEMENT OF THE CASE..................................................................3
I. STATUTORY BACKGROUND................................................................ 3
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND................................................................... 6
III. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND............................................................. 7
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT.................................................................10
ARGUMENT...........................................................................................13
I. THE DISTRICT COURT'S DECISIONS ARE CONSISTENT WITH
THE LANGUAGE AND PURPOSE OF THE CWA...................................13
A. Discharges of Pollutants to Jurisdictional Surface
Waters Through Groundwater with a Direct Hydrological
Connection Properly Require CWA Permits ...........................14
B. The District Court's Decisions Give Full Effect to
Congress's Intent to Restore and Maintain the
Nation's Waters.......................................................................20
C. The District Court's Finding of Liability is Consistent
with EPA's Longstanding Position..........................................22
II. THE COUNTY IS LIABLE FOR UNPERMITTED DISCHARGES
DUE TO THE "DIRECT HYDROLOGICAL CONNECTION" BETWEEN
THE GROUNDWATER AND THE OCEAN ............................................. 26
III. THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY HELD THAT THE COUNTY
HAD FAIR NOTICE FOR PURPOSES OF CIVIL PENALTIES .................. 32
CONCLUSION.......................................................................................36
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CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE........................................................37
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE.................................................................38
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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
VnQaC
Bath Petrol. Storage, Inc. v. Sovas,
309 F. Supp. 2d 357 (N.D.N.Y. 2004)............................................... 22
Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, Inc.,
467 U.S. 837 (1984).................................................................... 12,24
Friends of Sakonnet v. Dutra,
738 F. Supp. 623 (D.R.I. 1990)......................................................... 15
Greater Yellowstone Coal. v. Larson,
641 F. Supp. 2d 1120 (D. Idaho 2009)........................................ 31, 32
Haw. Wildlife Fund v. Cty. of Maui,
No. 12-198, 2015 WL 328227 (D. Haw. Jan. 23, 2015) .... 6, 7, 8, 9, 28
Haw. Wildlife Fund v. Cty. of Maui,
No. 12-198, 2015 WL 3903918 (D. Haw. June 25, 2015) ................... 9
Hawai'i Wildlife Fund v. County of Maui,
24 F. Supp. 3d 980 (D. Haw. 2014).......................................... passim
Headwaters, Inc. v. Talent Irrigation Dist.,
243 F.3d 526 (9th Cir. 2001).............................................................. 5
Hernandez v. Esso Std. Oil Co.,
599 F. Supp. 2d 175 (D.P.R. 2009)................................................... 19
Hudson R. Fishermen's Ass'n v. City of New York,
751 F. Supp. 1088 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).................................................. 22
Idaho Rural Council v. Bosma,
143 F. Supp. 2d 1169 (D. Idaho 2001) ............................ 11, 18, 19, 21
Inland Steel v. EPA,
901 F.2d 1419 (7th Cir. 1990).......................................................... 22
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In re EPA & Dept of Def. Final Rule,
803 F.3d 804 (6th Cir. 2015)............................................................. 24
McClellan Ecological Seepage Situation v. Cheney,
No. 86-475, 20 Envtl. L. Rep. 20,877 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 30, 1990) ....... 31
McClellan Ecological Seepage Situation v. Cheney,
763 F. Supp. 431 (E.D. Cal. 1989).................................................... 31
McClellan Ecological Seepage Situation v. Weinberger,
707 F. Supp. 1182 (E.D. Cal. 1988).................................................. 30
N. Cal. River Watch v. City of Healdsburg,
496 F.3d 993 (9th Cir. 2007).............................................................. 8
N. Cal. River Watch v. Mercer Fraser Co.,
No. 04-4620, 2005 WL 2122052 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 1, 2005) ... 16, 17, 19
Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr. v. Grabhorn,
No. 08-548, 2009 WL 3672895 (D. Or. Oct. 30, 2009) ...................... 19
O'Leary v. Moyer's Landfill, Inc.,
523 F. Supp. 642 (E.D. Pa. 1981)..................................................... 15
Rapanos v. United States,
547 U.S. 715 (2006)...................................................... 2, 8, 10, 15, 16
Rice v. Harken Expl. Co.,
250 F.3d 264 (5th Cir. 2001)...................................................... 19,20
S.F. Herring Assn v. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co.,
81 F. Supp. 3d 847 (N.D. Cal. 2015)................................................ 18
Sierra Club v. Abston Constr. Co.,
620 F.2d 41 (5th Cir. 1980).................................................. 10, 14, 15
Sierra Club v. El Paso Gold Mines, Inc.,
421 F.3d 1133 (loth Cir. 2005)........................................................ 16
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Sierra Club v. Va. Elec. & Power Co.,
No. 15-112, 2015 WL 6830301 (E.D. Va. Nov. 6, 2015) ................... 18
United States v. Approximately 64,695 Pounds of Shark Fins,
520 F.3d 976 (9th Cir. 2008)............................................................ 33
United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc.,
474 U.S. 121 (1985).......................................................................... 20
United States v. Velsicol Chem. Corp.,
438 F. Supp. 945 (W.D. Tenn. 1976)................................................ 16
Vill. of Oconomowoc Lake v. Dayton Hudson Corp.,
24 F.3d 962 (7th Cir. 1994).............................................................. 19
Wash. Wilderness Coal. v. Hecla Mining Co.,
870 F. Supp. 983 (E.D. Wash. 1994)................................................ 21
Yadkin Riverkeeper v. Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC,
No. 14-753, 2015 WL 6157706 (M.D.N.C. Oct. 20, 2015) ................ 18
Statutes
33 U.S.C. § 1251(a).................................................................................. 3
33 U.S.C. § 1311............................................................................. 3, 4, 14
33 U.S.C. § 1318(a)(A)........................................................................... 34
33 U.S.C. § 1319....................................................................................... 4
33 U.S.C. § 1319(d)............................................................................ 5,35
33 U.S.C. § 1341(a)................................................................................ 35
33 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(1)............................................................................ 31
33 U.S.C. § 1342.............................................................................. 1, 3, 4
33 U.S.C. § 1342(a)................................................................................... 4
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33 U.S.C. § 1342(b).................................................................................. 4
33 U.S.C. § 1342(d).................................................................................. 4
33 U.S.C. § 1344.................................................................................. 3,4
33 U.S.C. § 1362...................................................................................... 3
33 U.S.C. § 1362(6).................................................................................. 3
33 U.S.C. § 1362(7).............................................................................. 2,4
33 U.S.C. § 1362(8).................................................................................. 2
33 U.S.C. § 1362(12)(A)..................................................................... 3, 14
33 U.S.C. § 1362(14)................................................................................ 4
33 U.S.C. § 1365...................................................................................... 4
Federal Resister
39 Fed. Reg. 43,759 (Dec. 18, 1974)........................................................ 4
55 Fed. Reg. 47,990 (Dec. 2, 1990)........................................................ 23
56 Fed. Reg. 64,876 (Dec. 12, 1991).................................................. 5,23
66 Fed. Reg. 2960 (Jan. 12, 2001)....................................... 12, 23, 24, 26
80 Fed. Reg. 37,054 (June 29, 2015)............................................... 17,25
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The United States respectfully submits this brief as amicus curiae
pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 29(a).
INTEREST OF THE UNITED STATES
The United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
implements the Clean Water Act (CWA), 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387,
together with the states. That includes promulgating regulations
regarding the CWA's National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System
(NPDES). Id. § 1342. The United States participates as amicus curiae
because it has an interest in the proper interpretation of the NPDES-
permit provisions and the framework for analyzing whether discharges
of pollutants to jurisdictional surface waters through groundwater are
subject to those provisions.' The United States also has an interest
because it enforces the CWA and because it is a potential defendant in
actions alleging the discharge of pollutants from federal facilities
through groundwater.
The United States agrees with the result the district court reached
in this case and urges affirmance. In the United States' view, a NPDES
1 We use the term `jurisdictional surface waters" throughout this brief
to mean "waters of the United States."
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permit is required here because the discharges from the Defendant -
Appellant County of Maui's wastewater treatment facility are from a
point source (i.e., the injection wells) to waters of the United States (i.e.,
the Pacific Ocean'). To be clear, the United States does not contend that
groundwater is a point source, nor does the United States contend that
groundwater is a water of the United States regulated by the Clean
Water Act. Moreover, the United States does not agree with the district
court's application of the "significant nexus" standard from Rapanos v.
United States, 547 U.S. 715 (2006).
ISSUES PRESENTED
This amicus brief addresses the following issues:
1. Whether a discharge of pollutants from a point source to
jurisdictional surface waters through groundwater with a direct
hydrological connection to jurisdictional surface waters is regulated
under the CWA.
2. Whether the site -specific facts here give rise to a "discharge of a
pollutant" under the CWA.
2 More specifically, into the Pacific Ocean that is part of the United
States' territorial seas under the CWA. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7), (8).
Pil

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3. Whether the County had fair notice that it was subject to civil
penalties for its discharges to jurisdictional surface waters without a
NPDES permit.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
1. STATUTORY BACKGROUND
Congress enacted the Clean Water Act to "restore and maintain
the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation's waters."
33 U.S.C. § 1251(a). Congress therefore prohibited any non -excepted
"discharge of any pollutant" to "navigable waters" unless it is
authorized by a permit. Id. §§ 1311, 1342, 1344, 1362. The CWA defines
"discharge of a pollutant" as "any addition of any pollutant to navigable
waters from any point source." Id. § 1362(12)(A) (emphasis added).
Pollutant means "dredged spoil, solid waste, incinerator, sewage,
garbage, sewage sludge, munitions, chemical wastes, biological
materials, radioactive materials, heat, wrecked or discarded equipment,
rock, sand, cellar dirt and industrial, municipal, and agricultural waste
discharged into water." Id. § 1362(6). The CWA defines "navigable
waters" as "the waters of the United States, including the territorial
seas"; and a point source is "any discernible, confined and discrete
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conveyance, including but not limited to any pipe, ditch, channel,
tunnel, conduit, well, discrete fissure, container, rolling stock,
concentrated animal feeding operation, or vessel or other floating craft,
from which pollutants are or may be discharged." Id. § 1362(7), (14).
The CWA authorizes EPA to issue NPDES permits under Section
402(a), but EPA may authorize a state to administer its own NPDES
program if EPA determines that it meets the statutory criteria. Id.
§ 1342(a), (b). When a state receives such authorization, EPA retains
oversight and enforcement authorities. Id. §§ 1319, 1342(d). Hawaii
obtained such permitting authority in 1974. See 39 Fed. Reg. 43,759
(Dec. 18, 1974).
The CWA is a strict -liability regime that prohibits non -excepted
discharges unless they are authorized by a CWA permit. Id. §§ 1311,
1342, 1344. An unpermitted discharge constitutes a violation of the
CWA regardless of fault and is subject to enforcement by the state or
federal government or a private citizen. Id. §§ 1319, 1365. To establish
liability for a violation of the permit requirement, a plaintiff must show
there was (1) a discharge (2) of a pollutant (3) to navigable waters (4)
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from a point source. Headwaters, Inc. v. Talent Irrigation Dist., 243
F.3d 526, 532 (9th Cir. 2001).
The CWA includes a civil -penalty provision for those who violate
the Act. 33 U.S. C. § 1319(d). When determining a civil -penalty amount,
courts must consider "the seriousness of the violation or violations, the
economic benefit (if any) resulting from the violation, any history of
such violations, any good -faith efforts to comply with the applicable
requirements, the economic impact of the penalty on the violator, and
such other matters as justice may require." Id.
EPA's longstanding position is that a discharge from a point
source to jurisdictional surface waters that moves through groundwater
with a direct hydrological connection comes under the purview of the
CWA's permitting requirements. E.g., Amendments to the Water
Quality Standards Regulations that Pertain to Standards on Indian
Reservations, 56 Fed. Reg. 64,876, 64,982 (Dec. 12, 1991) ("[T]he
affected ground waters are not considered `waters of the United States'
but discharges to them are regulated because such discharges are
effectively discharges to the directly connected surface waters.").
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II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The County operates the Lahaina Wastewater Reclamation
Facility. Haw. Wildlife Fund v. Cty. of Maui, 24 F. Supp. 3d 980, 983 (D.
Haw. 2014) [Hawaii 1] . The facility receives approximately four million
gallons of sewage each day. Id. After treating the sewage, the facility
releases three to five million gallons of effluent into four on -site
injection wells. Id. at 983-84. The effluent travels into a shallow
groundwater aquifer and then flows into the Pacific Ocean through the
seafloor at points known as "submarine springs." Id. at 984; see also
Haw. Wildlife Fund v. Cty. of Maui, No. 12-198, 2015 WL 328227, at *1
(D. Haw. Jan. 23, 2015) [Hawaii II].
EPA, the Hawaii Department of Health (DOH), and others
conducted a tracer -dye study that confirmed this conclusion for injection
wells 3 and 4. Hawaii I, 24 F. Supp. 3d at 984. According to the study, it
took the leading edge of the dye 84 days to go from wells 3 and 4 to the
ocean and about 64% of the dye injected into these wells was discharged
from the submarine springs to the Pacific Ocean. Id. The dye's
appearance in the ocean "conclusively demonstrated that a
hydrogeologic connection exists." Id. at 985-86.
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Although tracer dye was not placed into well 1 and dye from well 2
was not detected in the study, the County "acknowledge [d] that there is
a hydrogeologic connection between wells 1 and 2 and the ocean."
Hawaii II, 2015 WL 328227, at *1-2. The tracer -dye study models
indicated that, in some circumstances, treated effluent from well 2
would move along flowpaths similar to those traveled by the dye
injected into wells 3 and 4 and emerge at the same springs.
Supplemental Excerpts of Record (SER) 237, 240, 243. There is no
dispute that given the proximity of wells 1 and 2, the modeling for well
2 predicts the flowpaths for discharges from well 1. Excerpts of Record
(ER) 443; SER 189.
III. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In April 2012, Plaintiffs -Appellees Hawaii Wildlife Fund, Sierra
Club -Maui Group, Surfrider Foundation, and West Maui Preservation
Association filed suit seeking to require the County to obtain and
comply with a NPDES permit and to pay civil penalties. Hawaii I, 24 F.
Supp. 3d at 986. The district court issued three partial summary -
judgment opinions in favor of Plaintiffs. The parties then entered into a
settlement agreement, in which the County stipulated to terms
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contingent on a final judgment that the County violated the CWA and
that the County was "not immune from" civil penalties. Haw. Wildlife
Fund v. Cty. of Maui, No. 12-198, ECF No. 259. The court entered final
judgment in accordance with its opinions and the settlement
agreement.
The district court's first opinion held the County liable under the
CWA for unpermitted discharges from wells 3 and 4. Hawaii I, 24 F.
Supp. 3d at 1000. The court started its analysis with the language and
purpose of the CWA, and also relied on EPA's interpretation and case
law. Id. at 995-96. The court explained that Plaintiffs "must show that
pollutants can be directly traced from the injection wells to the ocean
such that the discharge at the LWRF is a de facto discharge into the
ocean." Id. at 998 (emphasis in original). The court found that Plaintiffs
had met this burden. Id. at 998-1000. The district court also found CWA
liability under the "significant nexus" standard from Justice Kennedy's
concurring opinion in Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 755-56, and the Ninth
Circuit's application of that standard in Northern California River
Watch v. City of Healdsburg, 496 F.3d 993, 999-1000 (9th Cir. 2007).
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The district court's second opinion held the County liable for
unpermitted discharges from wells 1 and 2. Hawaii II, 2015 WL
328227, at *6. The County "expressly conced[ed] that pollutants
introduced by the County into wells 1 and 2 were making their way to
the ocean," and the court rejected the County's argument that liability
does not arise unless a pollutant passes through "a series of sequential
point sources." Id. at *2-4.
The district court's third opinion rejected the County's argument
that it was not subject to civil penalties for its unpermitted discharges
because it lacked fair notice. Haw. Wildlife Fund v. Cty. of Maui, No.
12-198, 2015 WL 3903918, at *6 (D. Haw. June 25, 2015) [Hawaii III].
The court determined that the County had notice because the
discharges "clearly implicate[d] each statutory element." Id. at *4. The
court further held that its adjudication of the first motion for partial
summary -judgment provided notice to the County. Id. at *6.
The parties then entered into a settlement agreement, in which
the County stipulated that it would make good faith efforts to obtain
and comply with a NPDES permit and that it would pay $100,000 in
civil penalties and $2.5 million for a supplemental environmental
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project, all contingent on a final judgment and ruling that the County
violated the CWA and that the County was "not immune from" civil
penalties. Haw. Wildlife Fund v. Cty. of Maui, No. 12-198, ECF No. 259.
The district court then entered a final judgment.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The judgment should be affirmed because it is consistent with the
language and purpose of the Clean Water Act and EPA's longstanding
interpretation and practice of issuing NPDES permits for discharges of
pollutants similar to the ones here. As Justice Scalia said in Rapanos,
the statute's language prohibiting "any addition of any pollutant to
navigable waters from any point source" does not limit liability only to
discharges of pollutants directly to navigable waters. See Rapanos, 547
U.S. at 743 (plurality op.) (emphasis in original). Courts have
interpreted the CWA as covering not only discharges of pollutants
directly to navigable waters, but also discharges of pollutants that
travel from a point source to navigable waters over the surface of the
ground or through underground means. E.g., Sierra Club v. Abston
Constr. Co., 620 F.2d 41, 44-45 (5th Cir. 1980). The discharges in this
case fall squarely within the statutory language.
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In the United States' view, a NPDES permit is required here
because the discharges at issue are from a point source (i.e., the
injection wells) to waters of the United States (i.e., the Pacific Ocean's
coastal waters). To be clear, the United States views groundwater as
neither a point source nor a water of the United States regulated by the
CWA. The United States therefore agrees with the district court's
conclusion that a NPDES permit was required here, but only to the
extent that the court's analysis is consistent with the above -stated
principles regarding groundwater.
The district court's conclusions accord with the CWA's purpose.
Congress enacted the CWA "to restore and maintain ... the country's
waters"; and to achieve this goal, Congress created a strict -liability
regime prohibiting discharges unless they are authorized under the
CWA. Recognizing Congress's goals in the CWA, courts have concluded
that in certain circumstances discharges of pollutants that reach
navigable waters through groundwater fall squarely within the
statute's terms. E.g., Idaho Rural Council v. Bosma, 143 F. Supp. 2d
1169, 1179-80 (D. Idaho 2001).
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Even if Congress's intent on this issue had been ambiguous, EPA
has clearly stated for decades that pollutants that move through
groundwater can constitute discharges subject to the CWA, and that
interpretation is entitled to Chevron deference. Chevron, U. S.A., Inc. v.
Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984). It has been
EPA's longstanding position that discharges moving through
groundwater to a jurisdictional surface water are subject to CWA
permitting requirements if there is a "direct hydrological connection"
between the groundwater and the surface water. See NPDES Permit
Regulation and Effluent Limitations Guidelines and Standards for
Concentrated Animal Feeding Operations, 66 Fed. Reg. 2960, 3017
(Jan. 12, 2001). This formulation recognizes that some hydrological
connections are too circuitous and attenuated to come under the CWA.
Id.
The County argues that the district court dispensed with the
requirements that a discharge be "from a point source" and "to
navigable water" because the effluent was discharged from a nonpoint
source and because the effluent was discharged into groundwater,
which is not covered by the CWA. Opening Brief (Op. Br.) at 21, 27, 30.
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This attempt to bifurcate the movement of the pollutants into two
separate events is inconsistent with the statute's language and purpose.
It also ignores the undisputed fact that the pollutants moved through
that groundwater to the ocean.
The County's argument that no civil penalty should have been
imposed because the County lacked fair notice lacks merit. The County
was on notice both as a general matter —through the CWA's language
and EPA's statements in rulemakings—and specifically —through
communications from EPA to the County. In any event, the question of
fair notice goes to the amount of the civil penalty, an amount the
County stipulated to, and is only one of many factors informing a civil -
penalty amount.
ARGUMENT
1. THE DISTRICT COURT'S DECISIONS ARE CONSISTENT WITH THE
LANGUAGE AND PURPOSE OF THE CWA.
The district court's judgment holding the County liable under the
CWA is consistent with the text and purpose of the statute. It is also
consistent with EPA's long -held position governing when the CWA
requires permits for discharges of pollutants that move to jurisdictional
surface waters through groundwater with a direct hydrological
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connection. The County cannot recast the nature of the discharges to
avoid that result.
A. Discharges of Pollutants to Jurisdictional Surface Waters
Through Groundwater with a Direct Hydrological
Connection Properly Require CWA Permits.
When Congress prohibited the unpermitted "discharge of any
pollutant," it defined this term broadly as "any addition of any pollutant
to navigable waters from any point source." 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311,
1362(12)(A). As the County concedes, "a point source does not need to
discharge directly into navigable waters to trigger NPDES permitting."
Op. Br. at 27. Because Congress did not limit the term "discharges of
pollutants" to only direct discharges to navigable waters, discharges
through groundwater may fall within the purview of the CWA.
This reading of "discharge of a pollutant" has been applied in
other similar contexts where discharges of pollutants have moved from
a point source to navigable waters over the surface of the ground or by
some other means. In Sierra Club v. Abston Construction, which
addressed discharges from mining operations that traveled to navigable
waters in part through surface runoff, the Fifth Circuit stated that
"[g]ravity flow, resulting in a discharge into navigable body of water,
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may be part of a point source discharge if the [discharger] at least
initially collected and channeled the water and other materials."3 620
F.2d at 44-45; see also Friends of Sakonnet v. Dutra, 738 F. Supp. 623,
628, 630 (D.R.I. 1990) (defendant liable for discharge of "raw sewage
[that] was running directly from the leaching field, on the surface of the
ground for approximately 250 feet, into the [surface water]"); O'Leary v.
Moyer's Landfill, Inc., 523 F. Supp. 642, 647 (E.D. Pa. 1981) ("[T]here is
no requirement that the point source need be directly adjacent to the
waters it pollutes.").
That Congress gave the term "discharge of a pollutant" a broad
meaning finds support in cases where CWA liability attached for
discharges from point sources that traveled through other means before
reaching surface waters. See Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 743 (noting that
courts have found violations of Section 301 "even if the pollutants
discharged from a point source do not emit `directly into' covered
3 The County misconstrues the United States' position as amicus curiae
in Abston Construction. See Op. Br. at 30-31. The United States took the
position that discharges of pollutants that traveled indirectly from a
point source to jurisdictional surface waters through surface runoff or
the gravity flow of rainwater come within the scope of the CWA. Brief
for the United States as Amicus Curiae, at 35-36, Sierra Club v. Abston
Constr. Co., No. 77-2530 (5th Cir. 1980).
15

waters, but pass `through conveyances' in between") (citing Sierra Club
v. El Paso Gold Mines, Inc., 421 F.3d 1133, 1137 (loth Cir. 2005)
(defendant could be liable for discharges conveyed from its point -source
mine shaft to jurisdictional surface water through a tunnel that
defendant did not own); United States v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 438 F.
Supp. 945, 946-47 (W.D. Tenn. 1976) (holding that CWA covered
pollutants discharged from defendant's point source to jurisdictional
surface waters conveyed through a sewer system that the defendant did
not own)).
Because courts have interpreted the term "discharge of a
pollutant" to cover discharges over the ground and through other
means, exempting discharges through groundwater could lead to absurd
results. As one court noted, "it would hardly make sense for the CWA to
encompass a polluter who discharges pollutants via a pipe running from
the factory directly to the riverbank, but not a polluter who dumps the
same pollutants into a man-made settling basin some distance short of
the river and then allows the pollutants to seep into the river via the
groundwater." N. Cal. River Watch v. Mercer Fraser Co., No. 04-4620,
2005 WL 2122052, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 1, 2005).
16

The County concedes that discharges need not be direct and that a
discharge through a conveyance requires a permit. Op. Br. at 27. The
County argues, however, that the conveyance itself must be a point
source and that because groundwater is not a point source, the district
court "impermissibly `transform[s] a nonpoint source into a point
source."' Id. at 27-28, 33. The County's interpretation is flawed.
Contrary to the County's argument, the district court did not eliminate
the requirement that a discharge be "from a point source." All it said
was that pollutants from a point source need not be emitted directly
into covered waters. The case law does not require the means by which
the pollutant discharged from a point source reaches a water of the
United States to be a point source.
While the County's statement that the statutory definition of
"navigable waters" does not include groundwater is accurate, Op. Br. at
21, it is beside the point. There is no dispute that groundwater itself is
not a "navigable water," 80 Fed. Reg. 37,054, 37,055 (June 29, 2015),
but the district court's decisions hinge on the movement of pollutants to
jurisdictional surface waters through groundwater with a direct
17

hydrological connection. Such an addition of pollutants to navigable
waters falls squarely within the CWA's scope.
The County relies on the treatment of groundwater in legislative
history, Op. Br. at 21-23, but this "only supports the unremarkable
proposition with which all courts agree —that the CWA does not
regulate `isolated/nontributary groundwater' which has no [effect] on
surface water." Bosma, 143 F. Supp. 2d at 1180. It does not undermine
the conclusion that discharges of pollutants through groundwater to
jurisdictional surface waters are subject to the NPDES program.
The County contends that case law does not support the district
court's interpretation, Op. Br. at 35-37, but this argument largely
ignores the majority of the courts that have addressed this issue and
concluded that discharges that move from a point source to
jurisdictional surface waters via groundwater with a hydrological
connection are subject to regulation under the CWA. See, e.g., Sierra
Club v. Va. Elec. & Power Co., No. 15-112, 2015 WL 6830301 (E.D. Va.
Nov. 6, 2015); Yadkin Riverkeeper v. Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC, No.
14-753, 2015 WL 6157706 (M.D.N.C. Oct. 20, 2015); S.F. Herring Assn
v. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 81 F. Supp. 3d 847 (N.D. Cal. 2015); Hernandez
In

v. Esso Std. Oil Co., 599 F. Supp. 2d 175 (D.P.R. 2009); Nw. Envtl. Def.
Ctr. v. Grabhorn, No. 08-548, 2009 WL 3672895 (D. Or. Oct. 30, 2009);
Mercer Fraser, 2005 WL 2122052; Bosma, 143 F. Supp. 2d 1169.
The County's reliance on other case law (Op. Br. at 35-36) is
unavailing for three reasons. First, none of the cases are controlling
precedent. Second, most of these decisions are inapposite because they
do not address the issue of discharges of pollutants that move through
groundwater to jurisdictional surface waters. In Village of Oconomowoc
Lake v. Dayton Hudson, Corp., the court examined whether
groundwater itself was a navigable water, i.e., a water within the
meaning of the CWA. 24 F.3d 962, 965 (7th Cir. 1994). That is distinct
from whether a CWA permit is required when pollutants travel to
jurisdictional surface waters through groundwater with a direct
hydrological connection.
Third, these cases do not foreclose application of the CWA where a
direct hydrological connection to jurisdictional surface waters can be
found. In Rice v. Harken Exploration Co., the court concluded that a
discharge of oil that might reach navigable waters by gradual, natural
seepage was not the equivalent of a discharge to navigable waters. 250
19

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F.3d 264, 271 (5th Cir. 2001). The court suggested, however, that it
would be open to finding a discharge had occurred through groundwater
when it underscored the plaintiffs' failure to provide any "evidence of a
close, direct and proximate link between [the defendant's] discharges of
oil and any resulting actual, identifiable oil contamination of a
particular body of natural surface water." Id. at 272.
B. The District Court's Decisions Give Full Effect to
Congress's Intent to Restore and Maintain the Nation's
Waters.
Congress's purpose in enacting the CWA—to "restore and
maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation's
waters" —embraced a "broad, systemic view ... of water quality."
United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 132
(1985). The County attempts to minimalize that goal. Adopting the
County's theory would allow dischargers to avoid responsibility simply
by discharging pollutants from a point source into jurisdictional surface
waters through any means that was not direct.
Courts have viewed the CWA's broad purpose of protecting the
quality of navigable waters as a clear congressional signal that "any
pollutant which enters such waters, whether directly or through
20

groundwater, is subject to regulation by NPDES permit." Wash.
Wilderness Coal. v. Hecla Mining Co., 870 F. Supp. 983, 990 (E.D.
Wash. 1994). "Stated even more simply, whether pollution is introduced
by a visible, above -ground conduit or enters the surface water through
the aquifer matters little to the fish, waterfowl, and recreational users
which are affected by the degradation to our nation's rivers and
streams." Bosma, 143 F. Supp. 2d at 1179-80.
The state's authority to protect groundwater is in no way impaired
by subjecting point sources to NPDES-permit requirements to protect
surface waters. Thus, the County's argument that it should not be liable
here because "preservation of states' authority over the regulation of
groundwater" is a "co -equal" goal of the CWA misses the mark. Op. Br.
at 34-35. This emphatically is not a case about the regulation of
groundwater. Instead it is about the regulation of discharges of
pollutants to waters of the United States. To the extent the County's
argument relies on the regulatory scheme governing disposal into wells,
Op. Br. at 24-27, that is flawed because the regulation of wells under
the Safe Drinking Water Act's (SDWA) Underground Injection Control
(UIC) program does not preclude or displace regulation under the
21

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CWA's NPDES program See Hudson R. Fishermen's Assn v. City of
New York, 751 F. Supp. 1088, 1100 (S.D.N.Y. 1990), aff'd, 940 F.2d 649
(2d Cir. 1991) (objectives of the CWA and the SDWA are not "mutually
exclusive"); see also Bath Petrol. Storage, Inc. v. Sovas, 309 F. Supp. 2d
357,369 (N.D.N.Y. 2004).
C. The District Court's Finding of Liability Is Consistent with
EPA's Longstanding Position.
EPA's longstanding position has been that point -source discharges
of pollutants moving through groundwater to a jurisdictional surface
water are subject to CWA permitting requirements if there is a "direct
hydrological connection" between the groundwater and the surface
water. EPA has repeatedly articulated this view in multiple rulemaking
preambles. In 1990, EPA stated that "this rulemaking only addresses
discharges to water of the United States, consequently discharges to
ground waters are not covered by this rulemaking (unless there is a
4 The County misconstrues EPA's position in Inland Steel v. EPA, 901
F.2d 1419 (7th Cir. 1990). EPA argued that not all disposals into
injection wells are discharges of pollutants under the CWA, and that
the connection between the wells and navigable waters in that case was
too attenuated to bring the discharges under the purview of the CWA.
Id. at 1422-23. That position (embraced by the Seventh Circuit) does not
mean that "injection into wells is not a discharge of pollutants requiring
a NPDES permit." Op. Br. at 27.
22

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hydrological connection between the ground water and a nearby surface
water body)." NPDES Permit Application Regulations for Storm Water
Discharges, 55 Fed. Reg. 47,990, 47,997 (Dec. 2, 1990).
And in the preamble to its final rule addressing water quality
standards on Indian lands, EPA stated:
[T]he Act requires NPDES permits for discharges to
groundwater where there is a direct hydrological connection
between groundwaters and surface waters. In these
situations, the affected groundwaters are not considered
"waters of the United States" but discharges to them are
regulated because such discharges are effectively discharges
to the directly connected surface waters.
56 Fed. Reg. at 64,982.
In 2001, EPA reiterated its position: "As a legal and factual
matter, EPA has made a determination that, in general, collected or
channeled pollutants conveyed to surface waters via ground water can
constitute a discharge subject to the Clean Water Act." 66 Fed. Reg. at
3017. EPA recognized that the determination was "a factual inquiry,
like all point source determinations," adding:
The time and distance by which a point source discharge is
connected to surface waters via hydrologically connected
surface waters will be affected by many site specific factors,
such as geology, flow, and slope. Therefore, EPA is not
proposing to establish any specific criteria beyond confining
23

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the scope of the regulation to discharges to surface water via
a "direct" hydrological connection.
Id. A general hydrological connection between all groundwater and
surface waters is insufficient; there must be evidence showing a direct
hydrological connection between specific groundwater and specific
surface waters. Id.
To the extent there is statutory ambiguity about whether the
CWA applies to discharges to jurisdictional surface waters through
groundwater, EPA's interpretation is entitled to Chevron deference.
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43.
The County's contention that the direct -hydrological -connection
standard is at odds with EPA's recently -stated position on whether
groundwater is a jurisdictional water misinterprets EPA's statements.
Op. Br. at 38-39. The Clean Water Rule, which was promulgated in
June 2015 (and stayed by the Sixth Circuit pending further order of the
court, see In re EPA & Dept of Def. Final Rule, 803 F.3d 804, 809 (6th
Cir. 2015)), expressly excludes groundwater from the definition of
"waters of the United States." 80 Fed. Reg. 37,054. But, as EPA
clarified, the fact that groundwater itself is not jurisdictional under the
CWA does not mean that pollutants that reach waters of the United
24

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States through groundwater do not require CWA permits. "EPA agrees
that the agency has a longstanding and consistent interpretation that
the Clean Water Act may cover discharges of pollutants from point
sources to surface water that occur via ground water that has a direct
hydrologic connection to the surface water. Nothing in this rule changes
or affects that longstanding interpretation, including the exclusion of
groundwater from the definition of `waters of the United States."' See
EPA, Response to Comments — Topic 10 Legal Analysis (June 30, 2015);
available at http://www.epa.gov/cleanwaterrule/response-comments-
cle an- water- rule -definition -waters -united- states. The County
erroneously attempts to conflate the jurisdictional exclusion of
groundwater with the role that groundwater can play as the pathway
through which pollutants from a point source reach jurisdictional
surface waters.5
5 The district court stated that if the proposed Clean Water Rule was
finalized, it "would likely mean that the groundwater under the
[facility] could not itself be considered `waters of the United States"' and
that this would affect whether Plaintiffs could also prevail under
Healdsburg. Hawaii 1, 24 F. Supp. 3d at 1001. But the court erred in
attempting to apply Healdsburg because the jurisdictional status of
groundwater itself is irrelevant to whether discharges that move
through groundwater to jurisdictional waters require NPDES permits.
25

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II. THE COUNTY IS LIABLE FOR UNPERMITTED DISCHARGES DUE TO
THE "DIRECT HYDROLOGICAL CONNECTION" BETWEEN THE
GROUNDWATER AND THE OCEAN.
Discharges of pollutants from a point source that move through
groundwater are subject to CWA permitting requirements if there is a
direct hydrological connection between the groundwater and a
jurisdictional surface water.6 Ascertaining whether there is a direct
hydrological connection is a fact -specific determination. 66 Fed. Reg. at
3017. To qualify as "direct," a pollutant must be able to proceed from
the point of injection to the surface water without significant
interruption. Relevant evidence includes the time it takes for a
pollutant to move to surface waters, the distance it travels, and its
traceability to the point source. These factors will be affected by the
type of pollutant, geology, direction of groundwater flow, and evidence
that the pollutant can or does reach jurisdictional surface waters. Id.
Here, the district court correctly held that the County discharged
pollutants to the ocean through groundwater. In Hawaii I, the court
6 Some courts refer to a "hydrological connection." The more accurate
formulation, however, is a "direct hydrological connection," which
recognizes that some connections are too circuitous and attenuated to
be under the CWA's purview.
26

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determined that a direct hydrological connection exists between the
groundwater and the ocean. The tracer -dye study clearly established
that the discharges moved from wells 3 and 4 to the ocean in relatively
short order.? Hawaii I, 24 F. Supp. 3d at 984. The study concluded that
after 84 days, the dye began to appear along the North Kaanapali
Beach, half a mile from the facility. Id. The tracer -dye study also
estimated that 64% of the treated effluent from wells 3 and 4 followed
this route to the ocean. Id.
Although the court's ultimate conclusion was correct, the court's
alternative explanation for the County's liability under the "significant
nexus" standard from Rapanos and Healdsburg was erroneous. Hawaii
I, 24 F. Supp. 3d at 1004. Rapanos and Healdsburrg applied the
"significant nexus" standard in determining whether the receiving
waters were "waters of the United States." In contrast, here, there is no
dispute that the Pacific Ocean (the receiving water in this case), as a
"territorial sea," is a "navigable water" under the CWA. This Court
Although this tracer -dye study simplified the analysis, such studies
are not the only means of demonstrating a direct hydrological
connection. It also is not necessary to trace the exact pathway that the
pollutants take to establish that a direct hydrological connection exists.
27

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should clarify that the "significant nexus" standard has no relevance
here.
In Hawaii II, the district court correctly held the County
discharged pollutants from wells 1 and 2 to the ocean through
groundwater. But the court's opinion did not go into great detail about
the movement through groundwater because the County "expressly
conced[ed] that pollutants introduced by the County into wells 1 and 2
were making their way to the ocean" and "acknowledge[d] that there is
a hydrogeologic connection between wells 1 and 2 and the ocean."
Hawaii II, 2015 WL 328227, at *2.
There was additional evidence that a direct hydrological
connection existed between wells 1 and 2 and the Pacific Ocean. First,
the tracer -dye study models indicated that in some circumstances
treated effluent from well 2 would move along flowpaths that were
similar to those traveled by the dye injected into wells 3 and 4 and
would emerge at the same submarine springs. SER 237, 240, 243.
Because wells 3 and 4 are located between the springs and well 2, the
flowpath for these discharges would be affected by the amount of
effluent injected into each well. SER 237. When most of the effluent was
m

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injected into wells 3 and 4, the effluent from well 2 would travel
northwesterly from the wells and not toward the springs; however,
when well 2 received all of the effluent, the study indicated that the
discharges would emerge at the springs. SER 240, 243. There was no
dispute that given the proximity of wells 1 and 2, the modeling for well
2 predicts the pathways for discharges from well 1. ER 443, SER 189.
Second, Plaintiffs' expert stated that the effluent discharged from
wells 1 and 2 "will be conveyed ... relatively quickly (i.e., with first
arrival at the ocean in a matter of months)" and concluded that "[s]ince
the aquifer material and hydraulic gradient in the area of all four ...
wells are similar, the groundwater flow will also be similar." SER 183.
Although the County's expert argued that the point of entry for
pollutants into the ocean from wells 1 and 2 could not be identified, the
County did not dispute that the study showed effluent emerging at the
same springs where the effluent from wells 3 and 4 emerged. Haw.
Wildlife Fund v. Cty. of Maui, No. 12-198, ECF No. 136, at 16.
Any fears about the implications of point -source discharges to
jurisdictional surface waters through groundwater with a direct
hydrological connection being subject to NPDES-permit requirements
29

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are unwarranted. Op. Br. at 43-44. EPA and states have been issuing
permits for this type of discharge from a number of industries, including
chemical plants, concentrated animal feeding operations, mines, and oil
and gas waste -treatment facilities. See, e.g., NPDES Permit No.
NM0022306, available at https://www.env.nm.gov/swqb/Permits/;
NPDES Permit No. WA0023434, available at
https://yosemite.epa.gov/rlO/water.nsf/NPDES+Permits/CurrentOR&W
A821.
Further, only those discharges that move through groundwater
with a direct hydrological connection to surface waters are affected.
That not all discharges through groundwater are subject to NPDES-
permit requirements is shown by cases where the hydrological
connections were too attenuated. In McClellan Ecological Seepage
Situation (MESS) v. Weinberger, the court agreed with the plaintiff that
discharges through groundwater may be subject to the CWA and
allowed the parties to submit evidence on the issue. 707 F. Supp. 1182,
1196 (E.D. Cal. 1988). Based on evidence indicating that it would take
"literally dozens, and perhaps hundreds, of years for any pollutants in
the groundwater to reach surface waters," the court found that there
30

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were no regulated discharges. MESS v. Cheney, 763 F. Supp. 431, 437
(E.D. Cal. 1989). And even after allowing the plaintiff an opportunity to
provide more testimony at trial, the court ruled that the plaintiff had
failed to meet its burden. MESS v. Cheney, No. 86-475, 20 Envtl. L.
Rep. 20,877 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 30, 1990), vacated on other grounds, 47 F.3d
325, 331 (9th Cir. 1995).
Likewise, in Greater Yellowstone Coalition v. Larson, evidence
indicated that the connection to surface waters was too attenuated. 641
F. Supp. 2d 1120 (D. Idaho 2009), aff'd 628 F.3d 1143, 1153 (9th Cir.
2010). In that case, federal agencies determined that a CWA Section
401 certification was not required for a mining operation. Under Section
401, 1a]ny applicant for a Federal license or permit to conduct any
activity ... which may result in any discharge into the navigable
waters, shall provide the licensing or permitting agency a certification
from the State ... that any such discharge will comply with the
applicable provisions." 33 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(1). The agencies based their
determination on evidence that before reaching surface waters, the
pollutants would pass through hundreds of feet of overburden and
bedrock, and then travel underground through soil and rock for one to
31

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� � 01 .� C G r�lr �' �• ••
four miles. Greater Yellowstone, 641 F. Supp. 2d at 1139. Modeling
predicted that the movement of peak concentrations would take
between 60 and 420 years. Id. The court weighed competing evidence
from the plaintiff and ultimately deferred to the agencies'
determination that the hydrological connection was too attenuated. Id.
r�Ti�i[f�
Unlike MESS and Greater Yellowstone, in which the connection
was too attenuated, the discharges here resulted from a direct
hydrological connection, and thus require a permit.
III. THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY HELD THAT THE COUNTY HAD
FAIR NOTICE FOR PURPOSES OF CIVIL PENALTIES.
In the Argument section of its brief, the County maintains that
this Court should direct the district court to set aside any civil penalties
"imposed on the County regardless of the outcome of the challenge to
the district court's liability rulings" because it lacked fair notice. Op. Br.
at 47. As an initial matter, the County would seemingly be precluded
from appealing the fair -notice issue as to civil penalties because it
stipulated to their amount in the settlement agreement. To the extent
that the County has reserved its right to appeal the issue, however, the
County's argument lacks merit.
32

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This Court has held that a party may not be deprived of property
through civil penalties without fair notice. See United States v.
Approximately 64,695Pounds of Shark Fins, 520 F.3d 976, 980 (9th Cir.
2008). To provide notice, "a statute or regulation must `give the person
of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is
prohibited so that he may act accordingly."' Id.
This Court looks first to the language of the statute when
determining whether a party had fair notice. Id. As discussed above,
Congress used broad language in the CWA in defining the discharge of
pollutants, and that expansiveness provides a reasonable opportunity
for a person to know what the statute prohibits. The breadth of that
language is only bolstered by the intent of the CWA.
Moreover, EPA has made multiple public statements in
rulemaking preambles that consistently described its interpretation
that discharges of pollutants to jurisdictional surface waters through
groundwater with a direct hydrological connection are subject to
NPDES permitting under the CWA. Further, with respect to specific
communications with the County, EPA sent two letters to the County in
early 2010. In January 2010, EPA stated that it was "investigating the
33

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possible discharge of pollutants to the coastal waters of the Pacific
Ocean along the Kaanapali coast of Maui." SER 5. This investigation
was spurred in part by a 2007 study concluding that much of the
nitrogen in Kaanapali coastal waters came from the County's facility
and a 2009 study that found the same nitrogen signature and other
"wastewater presence" in the ocean. Hawaii I, 24 F. Supp. 3d at 984.
The letter continued: "In order to assess the impact of the [facility's]
effluent on the coastal waters and determine compliance with the Act,
EPA is requiring the County to sample the injected effluent, sample the
coastal seeps, conduct an introduced tracer study, and submit reports
on findings to EPA." SER 5. EPA required this sampling, monitoring,
and reporting pursuant to CWA Section 308, under which "the [EPA]
Administrator shall require the owner or operator of any point source"
to provide the information. 33 U.S.C. § 1318(a)(A). The letter provided
notice that there was evidence suggesting a hydrological connection.
In March 2010, EPA responded to the County's request for a UIC
permit renewal under the SDWA "by informing the County that recent
studies `strongly suggest that effluent from the facility's injection wells
is discharging into the near shore coastal zone of the Pacific Ocean."
34

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Hawaii I, 24 F. Supp. 3d at 984 (quoting ER 122). As a result, EPA
required the County to apply for a CWA Section 401 water -quality
certification for its injection facilities as a prerequisite to EPA's
issuance of a new UIC permit. ER 121-22; see 33 U.S.C. § 1341(a). The
County's assertion that this letter did not put it on notice of potential
CWA liability because the certification was related to its UIC permit
rather than any obligations under the NPDES program is unavailing.
Op. Br. at 56-57. A UIC permit does not preclude the need for a NPDES
permit where required, and the March 2010 communication reiterated
EPA's position that the discharges might be covered by the CWA,
depending on the results of the ordered sampling, monitoring, and
reporting.
The County was on fair notice. In any event, fair notice is only one
of many factors informing a civil -penalty amount, see 33 U.S.C. §
1319(d), and thus the County's argument that the penalty should be set
aside for lack of fair notice alone is flawed.
35

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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the district court's judgment should be
affirmed.
OF COUNSEL:
KARYN WENDELOWSKI
U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency
Office of General Counsel
Washington, D.C.
May 31, 2016
90-12-14672
Respectfully submitted,
JOHN C. CRUDEN
Assistant Attorney General
/s/ Frederick H. Turner
FREDERICK H. TURNER
AARON P. AVILA
R. JUSTIN SMITH
Attorneys, U.S. Dep't of Justice
Env't & Natural Resources Div.
P.O. Box 7415
Washington, DC 20044
[phone]
frederick.turner@usdoj*.gov
36

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CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
WITH TYPE -VOLUME LIMITATION, TYPEFACE
REQUIREMENTS, AND TYPE -STYLE REQUIREMENTS
This brief complies with the type -volume limitation of Fed. R. App.
P. 32(a)(7)(B) (for amicus briefs as provided by Fed. R. App. P. 29(d))
because it contains 6,904 words, excluding the parts of the brief
exempted by Fed. R. App. P. 32(a)(7)(B)(iii). This brief complies with the
typeface requirements of Fed. R. App. P. 32(a)(5) and the type -style
requirements of Fed. R. App. P. 32(a)(6) because it has been prepared in
a proportionally spaced typeface using Microsoft Word 14-point Century
Schoolbook.
/s / Frederick H. Turner
FREDERICK H. TURNER
U.S. Department of Justice
Env't & Natural Resources Div.
P.O. Box 7415
Washington, DC 20044
[phone]
[e-mail]
37

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on May 31, 2016, I electronically filed the
foregoing brief with the Clerk of the Court for the United States Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit using the appellate CM/ECF system,
which will serve the brief on the other participants in this case.
Is/Frederick H. Turner
FREDERICK H. TURNER
U.S. Department of Justice
Env't & Natural Resources Div.
P.O. Box 7415
Washington, DC 20044
[phone]
[e-mail]
m