NCD980602163_19820501_Warren County PCB Landfill_SERB C_State and Local Government Review article Chemical Contamination and Governmental Policymaking - The NC Experience-OCR

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Chemical Contamination and Governmental Policymaking:
The North Carolina Experience
Sandra J. Wurth-Hough ... 54
The Impact of District Elections: A Case Study
Bruce 8. Clary and J. Oliver Williams ... 61
Linking Citizen Preferences to Legislative Choices:
The Role of Political Parties
Jerry W. Calvert ... 68
Education Levels, Participation Rates, and Policy
Output Efforts in the Fifty States
Gerald M. Henson ... 75
Positive Practitioner Attitudes toward Zero-Base Budgeting:
A Strategy for Achievement
Edward J. Clynch ... 80
Voter Preferences for Governmental Form and Reform
C.E. Teasley, Ill, and Luther F. Carter ... 86
A Note on the Local Effects
of State Revenue Centralization
Brett W. Hawkins, Richard D. Bingham, and David M. Hedge ... 91
Other Sources ... 96
State and Local Government Review is a triannual publication of the Institute of Government,
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Georgia 30602.
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STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT REVIEW
I
Chemical Contamination and
Governmental Policymaking:
The North Carolina Experience
Sandra J. Wurth-Hough•
■Abstract Among the complex e11l'iro11mental issues fac-
ing state and local goi•ernments, none has created more
unforeseen and frustrating problems than the issue of
regulating and disposing of widespread toxic materials.
711is isme was dramatized approximately four years ago
by the Lo11e Canal tragedy. Later, the focus of concern
rumed to the improper disposal of hazardous wastes by
gi•psy truckers. Such a case occu"ed in 1978, when 211
shoulder miles of Xorth Carolina secondary roads were
deliberately contaminated with deadly polychlorinated
biphenyls or PCBs. This article explores that crisis, and
the policies and politics in the continuing dilemma of
how to dispose of the contaminated material.
I n Go1·em111ent in America: People, Politics, and
Policy, Robert L. Lineberry writes:
We political scientists know a lot about parties,
Congress. and presidents. We know much Jess
about the relationships among ... environment,
and politics. TI1e reason is simple : for decades.
people. including political scientists, paid little
attention to the environment (6 . p. 523).
Yet federal . state . and local governments are increasingly
faced with a multitude of complex environmental issues ;
they constitute the "sleeping giant'" of the 1980s (2, p.
795] . One of the most serious issues is the existence of
widespread chemical contaminants in the environment
and the problems incurred in the regulating and disposing
of such toxic materials. Only 10 percent of these con-
taminants are disposed of in an environmentally sound
manner.
Knowledge of polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs) in
rdation to environmental law is a prerequisite to under-
•Assistant professor, Department of Political Science,
East Carolina Unil>ersity, Greem1ille, North Carolina
54
standing any chemical crisis in the United States [ I 5] .
This article will explore PCBs and the law and then will
present a succinct history of the most recent North Caro-
lina PCB crisis, with emphasis on the policy choices con-
sidered and the major state and federal regulatory frame-
work involved. This information is presented as a means
of answering the question, What consequences for p01icy-
making may be logically inferred from North Carolina ·s
experience with a chemical disaster? I
The "Mad Dog"2 and Environmental Law
The petrochemical polychlorinated biphenyl. chemically
similar to dioxin (Herbicide Orange), was first produced
50 years ago as "Aroclors" by Monsanto in Alabama .
Since the 1960s PCBs have been used primarily in sealed
systems for capacitors and power transformers in air
conditioning units and refrigerators. However, PCBs are
also found in a multitude of everyday products including
. . . heat transfer applications. washable wall
coverings and upholstery fabrics, envelope and
tape adhesives, coatings for ironing board covers,
waterproofers for canvas, film casting solutions,
insulating tapes, protective lacquers and epoxy
resins, "carbonless'' carbon paper, hydraulic
fluids, plasticizers, ceramic and metal laminates,
flameproofers for synthetic yams, additives in
xerographic processing, additives in caulking and
fireproofing sealants, and polluted food products
... [among others] [ l, p. 8).
Between 1930 and 1971, at least 750 million pounds
of the nonbiodegradable chemical are believed to have
1 Revised version of a paper presented at the annual meeting of the
Southwestern Social Science Association, Houston, Texas, I 980.
2Representative Gilbert Gude (Republican-Maryland) termed
PCBs a "mad dog" of the environment durinJ? the 1976 House of
Representatives' debate on the Toxic Substances Control Act.
been discharged into the environment, accumulating or
"biomagnifying" in the fatty tissue of animals. Low-level
concentrations are now estimated to exist in 91 percent
of all U.S. inhabitants (24]. North Carolina, ranking 11th
in the nation in the generation of hazardous wastes , yearly
creates between 600,000 . and J .8 million tons of waste,
some of it PCB-related. Virtually impossible to detoxify
under most conditions until recently, PCBs are not only
persistent but also are believed to cause a host of afflic-
tions, including decreased fertility , scarring skin disorders,
neurological and behavioral difficulties. deformities, still-
births, cancers. and death [ J 3, pp . 25-26; 23].
As early as I 936. medical reports explored the toxic
properties of PCBs. but it was not until I 966 that the
chemical was detected in the environment by a Swedish
chemist . The first reported public incident of PCB con-
tamination occurred in Kyushu. Japan, in 1968. when rice
oil used for cooking was.accidentally mixed with oil laced
with PCBs leaking from a heat exchanger [ J 3, p. 24].
Ultimately consumed by over I 3,000 people. the con-
taminated food had detrimental effects (cancers) still
being studied.
The United States movement toward "environmental
protection" as a societaJ goal proceeded incrementally
from this period , subject to extensive periods of public
debate. PCBs became a "national" issue in 1975 after
front-page warnings by the New York Times and the
efforts of "Deep Trout ." a government scientist who
leaked information on governmental analysis of PCBs.
However. a comprehensive policy objective has not
emerged at either the state or federal level, primarily be-
cause
First, we decided to protect the environment be-
fore we knew from what. how , and at what cost.
Second, protection of the environment encom-
passes many obje ctives, some of wruch are more
important than others. But, the illusion that this
protection is a unifying objective has led to the
theory that the environment must be uniformly
protected from injury , no marrer what the cost.
Third, protection of the environment was
adopted as an immediate societal objective, and
known, but often costly and ineffective methods
of protection , were chosen to achieve quick re-
sults (21, pp. 1344-45].
By the 1980s, environmental protection policy objectives
existed in a multitude of complex, firmly entrenched
U.S. statutes. Today, state and local governments are
faced with one or all of the following federal techniques:
The first distinguil es between maximum pro-
hibited and permissible discharge levels by setting
pollutant concentration standards for broad
classes of industrial and municipal activities. Dis-
charge limitation standards are enforced by pre-
activity licensing and environment actions should
the permit conditions be violated. A second tech-
55
May 1982
nique mandates a comprehensive environmental
evaluation of an activity before it is undertaken
to ensure that all options, including not doing
anything, are thoroughly considered; an environ-
mental impact statement (EIS) is ... the prime
example of this approach. A third approach
screens substances in advance of their use on an
ad hoc basis to determine if they are safe or not;
pesticide and toxic substances control legislation
use this technique (21 , pp. 1344-45).
The keystone of these techniques is found in the
1970 Executive Order creating the Environmental Pro-
tection Agency (EPA), designed to administer federal
programs and laws relative to pure water and clean air-
issues relatively easy to identify. The assumption appeared
to be that air and water standards were necessary to en-
sure the use of the particular resource for other. economic
purposes. Cleanup for public health reasons was not
emphasized. To dispose of solid waste materials , pesti-
cides, toxic substances, noise and radiation into the air,
surface waters, and oceans required a permit from EPA,
with strict penalties imposed on noncompliers. To date,
over 500 EPA guidelines have evolved and some 50 .000
permits dispensed on water discharges alone . Unfor-
tunately, a major loophole existed in the six major federal
laws3 EPA administered, to wit, the failure to control
the disposal of hazardous waste materials on land . Indeed ,
the enforcement of water and air pollution laws increased
the dumping of hazardous waste (discarded material that
may cause or contribute to serious illness or death or that
poses a substantial threat to human health or the environ-
ment when improperly handled) on the only relatively un-
regulated outlet. In 1976 Congress enacted Subtitle C of
the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA)
[ 15) , the first and most important law attempting to
restrict the witches' brew of hazardous solid wastes and
requiring disposal of both hazardous and nonhazardous
wastes in environmentally sound ways. (As North Carolina
officials would all too soon realize, RCRA as amended
also required public input throughout all aspects of
rule-making, implementation, and enforcement.) The
tracking of hazardous wastes from "cradle to grave"-the
pathways approach required by the mobility of the sub-
stances-would require that storage, transportation, and
disposal of hazardous materials be regulated. This would
involve, either directly or peripherally, many federal en-
vironmental statutes, thereby complicating state compli-
ance in no small measure.
Under RCRA as amended , EPA is required to promul-
gate a series of regulations that first identify hazardous
wastes, based on data developed describing the effects of
3The □ean Air Act (1970); the Clean Water Act (1972): the Safe
Drinking Water Act (1974 and 1977); the Federal Insecticide,
Fungicide and Rodenticide Act; the Toxic Substances Control
Act; the Refuse Act; among others.
,.
STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT REVIEW
the chemical substances on human health and the environ-
ment. The defining of waste material as hazardous, that
is, characterized by ignitability, corrosivity, reactivity
(explosiveness), and toxicity, and the approval of design
standards for disposal facilities constitute a stack of ma•
terials over seven feet high (3, p. 1459.).
The second phase of the federal approach is to iden-
tify, investigate. and clean up abandoned hazardous waste
dumps, although inadequate provisions exist for upgrad-
ing closed dumps. Of the 758 million pounds of PCBs
currently in use, it is estimated that 290 million pounds
are in dumps and landfills, while 150 million pounds are
in soils, water, and air , for which no recovery program
exists (2 , p. 795). The third phase is the "superfund"
legislation . the Oomprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation and Liability Act of 1980, which estab-
lishes a billion-dollar fund to finance emergency cleanup
of hazardous materials from user fees and government
monies when the party responsible for the contamination
is unknown. The second and third phases envision federal
standards for all generators and transporters of hazardous
wastes, facilities that treat , store, or dispose of such ma-
terials . and a system of permits for such facilities, whether
issued to individuals or states (4]. The fact that such
standards have been "in process" since 1978 may explain
the increased number of deliberate illegal contaminations.
EPA implementation , in November 1980, of standards
requiring all generators of more than 2,200 pounds of
hazardous materials a month to obtain operating permits
and to maintain extensive record-keeping standards did
not decrease illegal dumpings as expected. However , now
the federal government will know more about who is
generating chemical wastes, where it is hauled or stored,
and how the waste is disposed of ultimately . In l 982
generators of hazardous wastes will be required to divulge
more detailed information . including the type and quanti-
ty of wastes produced (22].
Of the over 70,000 chemicals in the environment
(and industry introduces a thousand new chemicals an-
nually), PCB was the first to be singled out in the Toxic
Substances Control Act (TSCA). With TSCA, federal
policy focus on to~ic substances moved from an emphasis
on the discharge of by-products or waste products into
the nation's waterways during the manufacturing process
to concern for the hazards posed by the continued use
and eventual disposal of the toxic chemical.
Currently, the persistence of a chemical and a low-
level human health risk is sufficient to limit its use before
human health or the environment is threatened [ 17).
Theoretically , TSCA subjects to federal regulation every
facet of the chemical industry, from manufacturing and
processing to commercial distribution. In the broad-based
wording of the statute, TSCA has two means to control
the problems of toxic chemical hazards. One is by estab-
lishing an inventof of existing chemicals so that sub-
stances can be identified by a standardized nomenclature
and so labelled. From this inventory , those chemicals that
seem to pose potential hazards are tested ; any chemicals
56
demonstrating oncogenic effects, birth defects, or gene
mutations are banned from manufacture and their use
is restricted, as PCBs were in July 1979. Data and inven-
tories of these substances are distributed at both federal
and state levels for use in -case of chemical emergency
events. A second means of fulfilling the legislative man-
date is to devise a system to examine new chemicals be-
fore they are marketed. This means of control has been
relegated to a back seat while officials contend with the
more pressing matter of illegal disposal of toxic wastes .
Since the manufacture of PCBs was halted in the
1960s, chemical contaminations have been caused mainly
by accidental leaks and spills. A survey of newspapers
throughout the United States reveals the regular occur-
rence of accidental PCB contaminations, such as electrical
transformer leaks that increase as equipment ages. At the
moment, the primary issue of hazardous waste manage-
ment concerns illegal waste disposal .
This hazardous waste problem, considered the result
of government foot-dragging by some and irresponsibility
in the private sector by others, commands public atten•
tion. It is the "last environmental frontier." From the
ecothrillers of mass entertainment's science fiction (7, p.
27] to front page newspaper headlines, the focus has
repeatedly been on PCBs. Dramatized since 1978 by the
Love Canal tragedy (the first time a U.S. president has
declared a man-made crisis a "national disaster") and the
"Valley of the Drums" in Kentucky, the con tern porary
emphasis has been fueled by the improper disposal of
hazardous wastes by gypsy truckers or midnight dumpers.
Such a case occurred in North Carolina in 1978.
The 1978 "Illegal Waste Invasion"
of North Carolina
Between June and August 1978 , approximately 30,000
to 35,000 gallons of liquid waste material containing
Aroclor 1260 from the Ward Transformer Company of
Raleigh were deliberately discharged by a New York waste
disposal firm along approximately 211 shoulder miles of
secondary roads in 14 central and eastern North Carolina
counties. The contaminations at 15 distinct spill locations
occurred in the most rural American state, where approxi-
mately 50 percent of the populace live along secondary
highways, typically adjacent to productive crop and grass-
lands or family gardens. Most of the spills took place after
August l, 1978 , when new TSCA disposal rules took
effect, requiring high temperature incineration for toxic
wastes at the cost of from one to three dollars a gallon
[8, p. l].
Identification of the contaminant was slow and pro-
ceeded on several fronts . The first pollution of public
highways was reported by private citizens in Warren Coun-
ty to the Highway Patrol, which in tum notified the Water
Supply Branch of the Division of Health Services. An in-
vestigation of the reported area as an oil spill was fruitless ,
so no further action was taken. A few days later, a farmer
at another spill area in Johnston County notified state
--y
,.
In
water quality personnel directly that a nauseous smelling
substance along the road had caused 25 to 30 migrant
workers in his tobacco fields to become severely ill. When
a second citizen experiencing the same odor took grass
clippings to a state laboratory in Raleigh , a staff chemist
was sent to gather grass, soil, and water samples from
the area . The odor was tentatively identified as Aroclor
J 260, and the Water Quality Operations Branch notified
the key state agency , the Department of Crime Control
and Public Safety. This department by legislative mandate
is responsible for protecting the public
... against crime and against natural and man-
made disasters ; to plan and direct a coordinated
effort ... to insure maximum cooperation be-
tween ... agencies ; ... to serve as the State's
chief coordinating agency ... , to insure the safety
of the public ... ; to have charge of investigations
of criminal matters ... and of such other crimes
and areas of concern in the criminal justice sys-
tem as the Governor may direct [ 11, pp. 57 J.
73).
The department functioned not only to coordinate
the many agencies involved in the PCB crisis but sought
also to educate North Carolinians during a period of
hysteria. One aspect of this role was the dissemination of
public news releases. The PCB topic received headline
emphasis virtually every day for over a year. Publicity
generated by newspapers and television played a major
part in the recognition of other spill areas. From the
beginning, chemical spills were attributed to "outsiders,"
although at the time no supporting evidence existed. It
was also assumed that the contaminated soil would be
moved outside the state, even before the decision-making
process began formally . This was evident from the first
public meeting between state officials and "concerned
citizens" in Johnston County on August 5, 1978 .
A few days later, a preliminary conference among
state agencies was attended by members of the Division
of Highways, Division of Health Services, the Attorney
General's Office , and public information personnel. On
August IO this conference was extended to include co-
ordinating meetings between the Department of Human
Resources, Department of Agriculture, Attorney General,
Department of Transportation , the U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency (particularly the Office of Toxic Sub-
stances), and the news media . The federal Department of
Agriculture did not become involved in the problem, as
crop food sources were mot considered directly affected
by the contaminations. The gr.oups involved began to ob-
tain advice from such diverse groups as state universities,
private sector experts, the National Center for Disease
Control, and federal and state research laboratories.
In late August, the Epidemiology Section of the
Division of Health Services called a meeting to investigate
the immediate health risks to people living along the spill
areas and others who would be involved in removing the
contaminated soil. Scientists from EPA, the National In-
57
May 1982
stitute of Occupational Safety and Health, the National
Institute of Environmental Health Sciences, and the Cen-
ter for Disease Control met with North Carolina repre-
sentatives of Health Services, Natural Resources and Com-
munity Development, the Department of Agriculture, and
the Department of Transportation , along with a single
industry representative from Carolina Power and Light.
By the first weeks in September, the authorized state
officials had decided to test, on noncontaminated areas,
the various methods for removing soil from roadway
shoulders. Soon after, one mile of PCB contaminated soil
was removed in Warren County and temporarily stored at
a disposal site. With estimates that some J0,000 truck-
loads or 53 ,000 tons of contaminated soil would have to
be removed. the state requested federal funds from the
Department of Housing and Urban Development and the
Department of Transportation to alleviate the financial
burden. Both requests were denied. During December,
an application for approval to establish a disposal site in
Warren County was filed with the EPA, followed in Janu-
ary J 979 by a public hearing on the proposed site at the
National Guard Armory in the county. During the same
period, state and EPA representatives met in Washington,
D.C., to discuss pertinent regulations and alternative solu-
tions to the waste disposal problem. Again, the financial
burden of removing the contaminated material was a
dominant aspect of the discussions.
By February, the policymaking apparatus had be-
come increasingly muddled by a seemingly incoherent
body of inputs from government regulators at both the
federal and state levels, private sector representatives
(essentially scientists), and a multitude of citizen groups,
the latter a major factor in the policy process. Given the
history of the ecological movement in the United States
and the recognition of such input mandated in the re-
spective federal laws, public participation in formulating
and implementing environmental law is neither novel
nor unexpected. What stunned North Carolina officials
was the depth of the protests voiced in the public hear-
ings jointly sponsored by the EPA and the state. An un-
swerving public sentiment was evident, verifying EPA
Administrator Douglas Costle's remark that "everyone
wants ... [hazardous] wastes managed, but not in their
backyard and our entire nation is someone's backyard"
[13 , p. 1459). The protests expressed in North Carolina
were fears that the state would become the "cesspool of
the South" [ J 4] . The popular reaction was one of intense
fear and anger, evident at all levels of political awareness
and even among some state officeholders. The fear (a
"Pearl Harbor strike," one observer termed it) was not
unlike reactions to terrorist events, but colored by a popu-
list distrust of government and its agencies . The distrust
intensified after state officials reportedly said they would
not be deterred by public sentiment [18 ; 19), escalating
the politicization of the contaminated soil issue . Critics
of government actions and inactions included culturally
and racially diverse groups: civic groups, hunting clubs,
political organizations, school and church groups, and
-
STATE AND LOCAL GfJYERNMENT REVIEW
gospel singing organizations. Regardless of their origin, the
arguments were basically that leaving the contaminated
soil anywhere in North Carolina would jeopardize the nat-
ural environment and impede economic development.
These initially individual reactions and sentiments led to
petition-gathering and unrelenting political and legal
pressure on county commissioners and state officials who
faced the dilemma of choosing from among five policy
options to dispose of the unwanted contamination (JO].
In-Place Treatment
Although EPA regulations under the Toxic Substances
Control Act prohibit in-place treatment, tests were con-
ducted by the state on February JS and March 22, 1979,
to detoxify the PCBs by applying activated charcoal ma-
terial on the contaminated highway shoulders. At the time
the tests were completed. the average PCB concentration
was below the federal maximum of 500 parts per million.
Thereafter, the requirement changed to SO parts per
million , which the test runs exceeded . This policy option
was negated when the EPA ruled against the state petition
for a waiver to allow in-place treatment. However, a layer
of asphalt was placed over the long PCB trails to impede
migration of the chemical.
Removal to PCB Material Incinerator
Only three incinerators in the United States, located in
New Jersey , Arkansas, and Texas, have the capability to
destroy PCB material by burning at high temperatures.
However. none ~as met EPA standards, which vary with
the type of facility and require the owner and operator
to acknowledge broad financial responsibility, train per-
sonnel for emergency situations. and provide a monitored
disposal system while maintaining reports and records
required by federal law . As Jong as federal policy pre-
cludes governmental ownership of such facilities, the use
of this option in chemical crises will be rare. EPA has,
however , awarded a contract to build a trailer-mounted
incinerator. That, combined with a new chemical process,
PCBX, will permit the detoxification of PCBs on site.
Developed by Sunohio, the process has been approved by
two EPA regions (May 1981 ). However, the system is
designed for liquid injection (20] and not dirt-bound
contaminations such as North Carolina's. In five to ten
years the process is expected to handle contaminations
too. For North c;arolina, removal to a PCB incinerator
was never seriously considered by state officials for
logistical and financial reasons.
Removal to Chemical Waste Landfill
At present only one chemical landfill, located in Living-
ston, Alabama. has the unrestricted capability to accept
chemical wastes. The Alabama site exists in large measure
because federal policy has favored the concept of large
regional hazardous waste facilities, whereas states have
attempted to ban the interstate movement or "importa•
tion" of such materials. As with the previous option, how-
ever, the problems of logistics, transportation, manpower,
58
and an estimated cost in excess of 12 million dollars pre-
cluded serious consideration of this alternative.
Do Nothing Alternative
Federal regulations preclude a "no action alternative"
whenever PCB contaminated soil has concentrations in
excess of SO parts per million, although thus far this is
the option inadvertently taken. Even without federal
regulations, such an alternative would not seem feasible.
More so than any other American state, North Carolina
secondary highways, and consequently the shoulders
bordering same, are broken by access roads to paralleling
property and utility distribution systems. Since 1978,
however, normal highway activities have been discon-
tinued in the contaminated areas to stop further distribu-
tion of the PCBs into the environment. Yet both federal
regulations and state mandated functions preclude explicit
acceptance of this alternative.
In-State Chemical Disposal Dumps
Left with only one viable legal option. the state, through
the North Carolina Department of Human Resources, be-
gan a Jong search for the least expensive alternative-se-
cure in-state landfills. Although EPA technical require-
ments formed the keystone of the search, local political
and physical factors were incorporated by necessity. Po-
tential site locations evaluated were those available to
the state and private property that was offered. Eminent
domain, still viewed as a carpetbagger's trick by most of
the populace in the Piedmont and Eastern counties, was
not publicly discussed at length.
Physically, areas east of the spills were not con-
sidered due to high groundwater levels, whereas areas
considerably to the west would have required transporta•
tion over long distances. Given the complex nature of the
changing federal requirements and the inexperience of
state officials with such a massive chemical contamination
issue, the process of evaluating potential dump areas went
exceedingly well. Some 90 sites in 20 counties were in-
vestigated, including all state-owned land such as parks,
forests, National Guard lands, prison farms, and other in-
stitutions and properties. Remote areas of the Fort Bragg
military reservation and sites offered by county govern-
ments, private individuals, and corporations were also re-
viewed . Most of the sites were rejected immediately be-
cause of their proximity to water and unsuitable soil
characteristics. In the winnowing process, only two
"types" of land areas remained viable options: landfills
in counties where the PCBs had been illegally dumped and
a 142-acre tract near Afton in remote Warren County, a
site ultimately approved by the EPA.
Although the state had already purchased the site in
Warren County, the public clamor against disposing of
the hazardous waste materials within the borders of North
Carolina increased. State officials argued that the decision
to utilize the landfill in Warren County was necessitated in
part by the time and expense involved in filing an environ•
l
-
..
mental impact statement for each landfill to be used [ J 2;
JO] . In August 1979, the fearful and angry residents of
Warren County, along with the local county commis-
sioners, garnered their resources and filed a lawsuit
against the state in a thus-far successful attempt to block
the disposal of PCBs in their county. The suit claims that
EPA disregarded federal regulations when approving the
site as an area where all tainted soil from affected coun-
ties would be buried. Further, a hastily adopted county
ordinance prohibits burial of PCBs in Warren County.
The state is therefore enjoined from developing the site
as a chemical dump or removing the contaminated soil
for disposal until the suit. now in U.S. District Court,
is settled. According to the state deputy attorney general,
"that could be next month or next year" (9) . The federal
restraining order contrasts with the S IO-billion class•
action suit filed by a Johnston County farmer attempting
to force state and federal officials to remove the con•
taminated soil.
At this time, the contaminated soil is essentially "in
place" where it was illegally deposited, except for the one
mile of material removed by the state for test purposes
and a truckload taken to Washington, D.C., in the farmer•
convoy protest march .
Conclusions
The North Carolina experience demonstrates that the
choice-making of po1icymaking is even more difficult
when rules and regulations within which the policies are
made are not only complex but organic . The multiplicity
of power dispersed in the various federal and state agen•
cies cannot help but impede the decision process. Ideally,
coordination in emergencies should be routine, following
properly designed and tested procedures. In reality, by
the time a contamination occurs. it is too late for most
positive action. The best policy. then , appears to be to
make unsafe disposal of chemicals more expensive than
safe disposal. Regulation of potential danger with appro•
priate authority to control problems is essential . This
would require considerably more financial and resource
support than is presently available from either federal or
state sources.
A related area in need of support is the improvement
of communications between policymakers and the public.
Environmental law has provided Americans an unpre•
cedented access to the courts, a filibustering technique all
too frequently employed. However. few mechanisms exist
for the policymaker to override local objections, even
when the costs to human health and crops dictate that
such an override should occur. An increased educational
and public information program aimed not only at citi•
zens but also at state officials might help citizens face the
hazardous waste issue more realistically.
Hazardous waste disposal is a major problem hinging
ultimately on a social question : What level of residues in
the environment are we ~illing to accept in order to main-
tain a largely chemical-based lifestyle? In an ideal demo-
59
May 1982
cracy, the public determines this policy "trade-off." based
on an awareness ofall aspects of the issue. Yet experience
demonstrates a resistance to facing such problems public-
ly. This reticence may be traced partially to a long-stand•
ing implicit standard operating procedure employed by
many agencies-the avoidance of public discussion . Agen•
cies working with the chemical industry and users of its
products tend to avoid the news media, the primary
source of public information for our citizens, in order to
protect businesses with whom cooperation is more effec•
tive than legislation. This "cooperating-with-the-source"
of the problem aspect is less controversial when the other
side of the policy coin is successful, i.e., cleaning up spills
in a hurry . The events in North Carolina did not permit
either to occur. However, "public awareness" officials
are now part and parcel of most government bodies.
Promoting awareness is particularly necessary in tech•
nologically based departments staffed by natural scientists
and engineers. These elites employ technical languages
unfamiliar to most of the public. More inlportant, the
scientific community is culturally isolated and subjected
to a strong anti-intellectual strain directed at the expert
social analysts and administrators. The scientific com•
munity typically leaves political activism to others, al-
though the expertise of this technical aristocracy pro•
vides them a potentially extraordinary role . Unfortunate•
ly, the community does not speak with a single voice,
further complicating environmental issues.
This Jack of a single informed voice has resulted in
failure to enact preventive state legislation controlling the
disposal of toxic substances. North Carolina, for example.
passed such laws after the J 978 crisis. The problems the
state encountered in the chemical crisis are explicitly
recognized in the emergency response authority of the
Toxic Substances Task Force. Further, a new statute pro-
vides that the dumping of toxic substances is a felony ,
punishable upon conviction by a fine of SI00.000 per day
of violation and/or imprisonment , a far cry from the mis•
demeanor it superseded .
In 1980, Governor James 8. Hunt, Jr., appointed a
17-member commission, the Governor's Task Force on
Waste Management , to study alternative plans for manag-
ing and disposing of hazardous wastes in the state. After
months of study and public meetings. the task force
recommendations were submitted to the governor and
state legislature in J 98 I. The extensive report emphasized
the necessity for a strictly enforced waste management
plan. including the following three steps to obtain dis-
posal sites for hazardous wastes in North Carolina [5).
1. The state must have condemnation power to
acquire land for in-state disposal operations.
2. The state must be able to override local zon-
ing restrictions in decisions on facility siting.
The state legislature modified this provision
to include the right to judicial review of the
governor's actions.
3. The state should establish funds or incentives
:
•
STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT REVIEW
to support ("reward") communities where
disposal facilities are located.
These controversial policy guidelines, now part of
state law. are merely stopgap provisions. As specialists
have long recognized , the greater issue is the major re-
search effort necessary to reduce hazardous wastes. The
solutions are expensive, but given the growing volume of
waste, the damage to a state's economic future if toxic
chemicals are not regulated, and the significant health
risks involved, all states must have policies and statutes
that demonstrate a high degree of concern for the dangers
of hazardous waste disposal . North Carolina's new waste
management plan. born of almost four years of chemical
crisis. may well provide an important state policy model
for others.
Addendum
In June J 98:?. work was begun on a 20-acre landfill in
Warren County. The PCB-laden soil cleanup and the
operation of that landfill are part of a detailed cooperative
agreement negotiated between the U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency and North Carolina . Approximately
90 percent of the total cost involved, some S:?.5 million,
comes from federal funds. After years of policy debate
and lawsuits. this one environmental dilemma is almost
over .
References
I. Boyle, Robert H. and Hi!!hland , Joseph H. "The Persistence
of PCBs." £111•iro11ment 21 (June I 979): 6-13, 37-38.
2. "Cleanin!! Up Chemical Dumps Posinf Dilemma for Con•
pess." Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report 38 (March
22. I 980 ) [95-96.
3. Deland, '.\fichael. "Hazardous Waste Disposal." £11vironme11-
ral Scie11ce and Tech11ology 13 (December 1979): 1459 .
4. "Hazardous Waste ~anagement: Overview and Definitions."
Federal Register. EPA 40 CFR Part 260 (February 26,
1980) 12722-44.
5. Johnson. Sherry. '.'Senate OKs Bill Regulating Hazardous
Wastes in N.C." The Raleigh Ne....-s and Observer, May
27, 1981, pp. I. 5.
60
6. Lineberry, Robert L. Go1•m,ment in America: People, Poli-
tics and Policy. Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1980.
7. Marinelli, Janet. "Review." Environmental Action 10 (Jan•
uary 1979): 27.
8. Nichols, Rich. "More Chemical Spills Spotted on Roads."
The Raleigh News 1111d Obsen·er, AuFust 9, 1978, pp. 1, 6.
9. North C1rolina Department of Crime Control and Public
Safety. Public relations releases, 1978-1981.
10. ----· "Removal and Disposal of Soils Contaminated
with PC"Bs aloni? Hi!!hway Shoulders in North Carolina."
Draft Environmental Impact Statement, December,
1979.
I I. North Carolina Executfre O,gani:ation Act. Ch . 143B
(1973): 571-73.
12. Pearsall, Chip. "Dumpin~ PC"Bs in Wuren Is Favored." The
Raleigh News and Obsen·er, January 3. 1980, p. 41 .
13. "A Pla.{!ue on Our Children." No1:a (WGBH tranmipt). 1979.
14. "700 Protest Proposed North Carolina Chemical Dump."
The New York 7Tmes, January 6, 1979, p. 6.
15. Polychlorinated Biphenyls . Hearin1,?s before the Subcom-
mittee on Fisheries and Wildlife Conservation and the
Environment, Committee on Merchant Marine and
Fisheries, House of Representatives, 94th Con.[!., 2d sess.,
January 1976. ·
16. Resource Conservation a11d Recorery Act. 42 U.S.C. 6903.
17. Ritch. John B., Jr., "Protec-tin.{! Public Health from Toxic
Chemicals ." Enrironmental Scie11ce a11d Technology 13
(AU.{!USt 1979): 923-26.
18. Siceloff, Bruce. "PCB Burial Proposal Wins No Hearts at
Warren Hearin!!," 'lhe Raleigh News and Observer, Janu-
ary 5, 1979, pp. 31, 33.
19. ----· "State in Face-Off Allain Over PCB." The
Raleigh News a11d Obsen·er, January 4, 1979, p. 29.
20. "Sunohio Develops Commercial Device That Destroys PCBs."
1he Wall Street Joumal, September 12, 1980, p. 44.
21. Tarlock, Anthony. "Environmental Law: What It Is, What It
Should Be." Em·iro11me11tal Science and Technology 13
(November 1979): 1344-48.
22. Trauberman, Jeffrey. "Superfund: A Legal t.:pda1e ." En-
••ironme11t 23 (March ]981): 25-29.
23. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. Hazardous Waste.
Washin.{!ton, D.C.: Office of Water and Waste Manage-
ment, 1980.
24. "U.S. Gives First Approval to PCB Detoxification Process."
711e Raleigh News and Obsen·er, May 27 , 1981, p. 3.