NCD980602163_19810101_Warren County PCB Landfill_SERB C_The Dumping of PCB on North Carolina Highways-OCR

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The Dumping of PCB on North Carolina Highways
David Hershman
Edited by
Matt Morra
January 1981
This project was funded by a grant from the
Integrated Case Studies in Natural Resource
Analysis Program, School of Forestry
and Environmental Studies
Durham, N. C. 27706
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THE DUMPING OF PCB ON NORTH CAROLINA HIGHWAYS
CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
THE EVENT.............................. 1,2
PCB. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
THE RESPONSE
Emergency Response ................... 3-7
Enforcement .......................... 7-11
Clean-Up Operation ................... 11-16
PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED
Emergency Response ................... 16-18
Enforcement .......................... 18-20
Clean-Up Operation ................... 20-21
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION ................. 21,22
ENDNOTES ............................... 23-26
APPENDICES
A -Location Map of PCB Spills
B -OHR Merro to Citizens on PCB
C -Or. Weber's In-Place Treatment Proposal
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INTRODUCTION
This case study examines governmental response to the dumping of
polychlorinated biphenyls along North Carolina highways in the surtmer of
1978. Reaction to this deliberate dumping was extensive, especially
within state government. The examination of this reaction provides an
excellent opportunity to analyze problems encountered in response to an
incident involving a multitude of actors.
This study will first describe the event and supply background
information on the material involved. The response will then be described
with special attention given to the roles played by the major actors. To
simplify the analysis of the response, three categories will be presented:
the emergency response, the enforcement action, and the clean-up
operation.
The emergency response includes all attempts to identify the nature
and scope of the incident, what danger it presented, what action would be
necessary to minimize this danger, and the implementation of these
actions. Enforcement includes apprehension and prosecution of those
responsible and any attempt at recovery of damages. The clean-up
operation is an attempt to rectify the damage incurred.
The presentation of the response will be followed by an
identification of the extensive problems encountered. This work does not
constitute a comprehensive analysis, but does provide direction with
regard to further study.
THE EVENT
In late June of 1978, the discharge of an unknown chemical took place
along rerrote roads of the Fort Bragg Military Reservation in Cumberland
County, North Carolina. The discharge was investigated by Fort Bragg
THE EVENT (cont.)
personnel who secured samples of the material.l/ Apparently, the samples
were not analyzed, and the incident received only nominal attention.
2
Approximately one month later, a private citizen in Warren County
reported a spill to the North Carolina Highway Patrol. Personnel from the
state's Water Quality Program investigated the spill on July 31.Y
Assuming the substance to be oil, the investigators decided not to collect
samples after detennining that there was no evidence of discharge into
surface waters.11
On August 2, a Johnson County farmer reported a roadside spill near
his fields. The Division of Environmental Management of the North
Carolina Department of Natural Resources and Community Development (DNRCD)
dispatched a staff chemist to secure samples. On August 4, the Division
of Environmental Management identified the material as Aroclor 1260, a
polychlorinated biphenyl (PCB) compound.ii The toxic nature of this
compound and the apparent intentional nature of the dumpings created
interest and concern. The news exploded in the media, and it remained as
the lead story for several weeks as new reports of intentional dumpings
occurred almost daily.
An estimated 210.97 shoulder miles of mostly rural roads in thirteen
North Carolina counties were finally identified as contaminated areas.if
The majority of the contamination resulted from intentional night dumping
of PCBs from unmarked trucks.
The public, press, and government officials demanded apprehension of
the persons responsible, and the State Bureau of Investigation (SBI) was
called in to investigate . .W Meanwhile, state officials were faced with an
enormous clean-up dilenma which tested the emergency response capability
of the state government. These three facets of governmental response to
the dumpings (emergency response, enforcement, and clean-up efforts),
although integrally related, will be presented separately for the sake of
analysis.
3
POLYCHLORINATED BIPHENYL (PCB)
PCB is a chlorinated hydrocarbon which has been used mainly in
electrical transformers and capacitors because of its resistance to
breakdown under high temperatures. The chemical was introduced in 1929,
and until found in Swiss waters in 1966 was assumed to decompose in the
environment.II The problem of environmental contamination has now been
well documented as significant quantities of PCBs have been reported in
the atmosphere, soil, water, sediment, fish, wildlife, and even in samples
of human blood and tissue.W
In the only human mass ingestion of PCB on record, 1,291 Japanese
people ate heavily contaminated rice oil. Immediate reactions included
discoloration of the skin, fatigue, disorder of the peripheral nervous
system, and abdominal pain. In addition, a higher number of stillbirths
were later experienced . ..W
Laboratory studies have shown PCBs to cause reproductive defects,
cancer, and mutation in test animals. Although the long-term health
effects of PCBs on humans are not clear, Congress determined the danger of
widespread use of PCBs serious enough to prohibit its manufacture through
Section 2605(e)(2)101 of the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA) of 1976.
The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) was given the authority to
regulate the storage and disposal of PCBs under Section 2605(e)(l)l!/ of
TSCA. These regulations appeared in the February 17, 1978 Federal
Register (40 CFR 761) and again on May 31, 1979 (Vol. 44, No. 106).
THE RESPONSE
Emergency Response: The emergency response period lasted for
approximately one month. During this time, four departments of the state
government and the governor's office attempted to cope with the immediate
problems associated with the spill.
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THE RESPONSE (cont.)
Department of Natural Resources and Community Development (DNRCD)
DNRCD is responsible for responding to chemical spills within the
state based on its authority to implement a majority of the state's
environmental laws. This agency responded to the first report on July 31
as a possible violation of the Oil Pollution Control Law,121 but did not
collect samples because no evidence of the chemical was found in surface
waters.
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The second report came to the Water Quality Operations Branch,
Division of Environmental Management on August 2. After the sampling and
subsequent analysis was completed, the Laboratory Analytical Section
identified the substance as a PCB compound on August 4. Thus, a one-week
time period had elapsed between the discovery of the first spill (July 27)
and identification of the compound.
Because DNRCD was the first to respond, this agency became the focal
point for early involvement in the incident. The responsibility for
analyzing soil samples remained with this agency throughout the clean-up
operation.
Identification of a PCB compound on August 4 necessitated the release
to the press of a statement which described the spills and requested aid
in locating others and identifying the responsible persons.131 This
resulted in reports from many sources including the Highway Patrol, state
highway maintenance personnel, local enforcement personnel, and private
citizens. This facet of emergency response was important because it aided
in a determination of the extent of the spill.
The August 4 news release indicated that no apparent environmental
damage had taken place but failed to mention possible public health
problems. The following day, the head of the Water Quality Operations
Branch met with citizens along the Highway 210 spill site, conducted
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THE RESPONSE (cont.)
door-to-door interviews, and requested the Division of Highways of the
Department of Transportation to cover the spill area with a layer of sand
to suppress noxious odors.
Department of Transportation (DOT)
The Division of Highways had two peripheral roles during the first
week of response. First, as mentioned above, its maintenance crews
covered the contaminated areas with sand. This action served to contain
the irritating odors of the spill which were not due to PCBs but to a
solvent used to contain the PCB compounds.141 In addition, the sand
prevented splashing of puddled areas. Second, the Division, along with
the North Carolina Highway Patrol (Department of Crime Control and Public
Safety), served as a funnel for information concerning the spills.
After the first week, the Division's maintenance section implemented
a maj~r portion of the state's emergency response activity. Beginning on
August 28, a solution of activated carbon and liquid asphalt was applied
to all contaminated areas as a temporary measure to prevent migration of
the chemical.151 This action represented an attempt to minimize
environmental and health risks in the short-term while a permanent
solution was sought.
Department of Human Resources (OHR)
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The Division of Health Services was not the focal point of early
emergency response because of the central role played by DNRCD. Questions
of public health quickly arose, however, and by August 7 officials of the
Division of Health Services were meeting with those of DNRCD. On August
10, a memo was sent to all local health directors concerning the PCB
spills. Nevertheless, it was not until intense pressure came from local
citizens and the press that a broader attempt was made to inform local
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THE RESPONSE (cont.)
citizens of possible dangers.li1 This came in the form of a "Notice to
North Carolina Citizens Living on Roads Where PCBs Were Dumped" given to
local health departments for door-to-door distribution on August 16.171
Governor Hunt, responding to criticism that efforts to inform citizens
should have come much sooner, stated that most of the citizens had been
sufficiently informed by the publicity devoted to the case by the media.181
The OHR notice emphasized that there was no illlnediate threat from the
presence of PCBs. However, it did warn people to avoid, not to eat
vegetables from, and not to allow livestock to graze on contaminated
areas.
A second action by OHR (Division of Health Services) was to take
blood samples from a number of residents who may have been exposed to
dangerous levels of PCBs (August 18).191 The results of the tests were
negative.
Department of Agriculture (DOAG)
The Food and Drug Protection Division began taking limited samples of
crops from two locations on August 18.201 On August 29, flyers containing
health effect warnings concerning crops and livestock were delivered to
residents along contaminated areas. There was some confusion because the
contents of this memo conflicted with those of the Division of Health
Service's memo which had previously failed to emphasize such health
effects. In response to the conflicting accounts, the Food and Drug
Protection Division analyzed additional samples. It then called a press
conference to release information substantiating the Division of Health
Service's memo.211
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THE RESPONSE (cont.)
Governor's Office
In addition to acting as a spokesman during the initial period, the
Governor later requested federal assistance. This came in the fonn of an
appeal on August 15 to the President of the United States to declare the
counties disaster areas; an appeal that even the Governor thought would
be unproductive.221 The appeal was denied as anticipated. A request for
aid from the Federal Disaster Assistance Administration, Department of
Housing and Urban Development was also denied September 29. The
Governor's office unsuccessfully investigated other sources of federal
aid, including the federal Highway Emergency Assistance Fund.231 The
federal decisions were supported within the context of the problem, based
on the fact that the state's own health officials did not consider the
situation an irrrnediate health hazard.241 These actions represent
emergency responses and attempts to gain aid for an expensive clean-up
operation.
Media
Special note must be taken of the role played by the media in
emergency response to the PCB incident. Publicity aided both in spill
identification and in public notification of the hazard. Pressure from
the media was also effective in influencing state officials to notify
residents directly and to conduct health surveys. The agencies exercised
caution in their dealings with the media, fearing the potential for
public panic.
Table 1 sulllTlarizes the emergency response and lists the actors
involved with each respective action.
Enforcement: Initial response toward apprehending persons responsible
for the PCB dumping can best be described by the following paragraph
taken from a DNRCD news release:
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THE RESPONSE (cont.)
1 Tab e 1. E mer ciencv R esponse
EMERGENCY RESPONSE ACTOR
Identification of the nature DNRCD, DOT, Highway Patrol,
and scope of the spills media
Request for emergency assistance Governor's Office
Determination of extent of OHR, DOAG
health hazard
Determination of extent of DNRCD
environmental damage
Notification of hazard DNRCD, OHR, DOAG, Local
departments, media
Minimization of immediate DOT
hazard
... Assistance from the Highway Patrol, Attorney
General's Office, and general public to catch persons
apparently intentionally dumping chemicals and oil
along secondary roads in North Carolina was sought by
Howard N. Lee, Secretary of Natural Resources and
Community Development ...
health
Attorney General Rufus L. Edmiston responded to this appeal by
transmitting a message to all law enforcement officers on the statewide
Police Information Network. Basically, early efforts to apprehend the
dumpers were similar to those aimed at determining the scope of the
spills, i.e., massive statewide appeals.
Six days later, the State Bureau of Investigation (SB!), an agency
under the North Carolina Department of Justice, was officially requested
to conduct an investigation of the matter by DNRCD Secretary Lee. As a
result, this agency headed the enforcement operation up to and including
the prosecution effort. Pleas for additional help continued through the
media. The Environmental Protection Agency sent personnel to assist,
while aid was also obtained from out-of-state sources, especially New
York. The SB!, however, was in charge of the investigation and for the
most part kept prosecution separate from the emergency and clean-up
responses .fi
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THE RESPONSE (cont.)
The scope of this criminal environmental enforcement effort was
unprecedented. The SBI had been involved in a chemical discharge
approximately a year earlier261 but no charges were filed, and the spill
was attributed to vandalism. The present problem involved a larger scale
operation allegedly undertaken to circumvent newly enacted federal
regulations and thus, the cost of legal disposal. The SBI 's role was to
collect and preserve evidence, identify the responsible persons, and aid
in the prosecution after a request for such aid came from local district
attorneys.
9
On August 28, three New York men, Robert Burns and his sons, Randall
and Timothy, were indicted by the state on seven counts: felonious damage
to public property (two counts), felonious conspiracy to damage public
property, felonious criminal nuisance, misdemeanor injury to growing
plants (two counts), and misdemeanor operation of a disposal system
without a permit .271 They were also charged with violations of the
federal Toxic Substances Control Act. The Burnses eventually pled guilty
in both state and federal court to reduced charges in return for testimony
at the trial of two Raleigh men, Robert Ward, Jr., and Robert Ward III.281
The state charges against the Wards included conspiracy and aiding in
the dumping, while the federal indictments accused the Wards of violating
the Toxic Substances Control Act.291 In the state trial held in June
1979, charges against Robert Ward III were dropped. Robert Ward, Jr., was
acquited.3O1 The state alleged that the Wards of Ward Transformer Company
in Raleigh paid the Burnses to dispose of the material, and that the
Burnses dumped the material instead of disposing of it properly . It was
also alleged that the Wards knew of the Burnses 1 plan to dump the material
preceding the actual action.
One part of the enforcement response which has not taken place as of
the writing of this paper is the proposed civil action. Governor Hunt has
. -----· . -· ---· ------r-FIGUl-il:: I. "DECISION TREE" FLOW CHART OF PCB CLEANUP OPERATION i>OB CLEANUP OPERATION MOVE SOIL AND BURY 2 LEAVE ~OIL IN-PLACE 1 Ol'm "P~IVATE"a SI'l'E 4 !PUBLIC OPPOSITION TO CHATHAM AND WARHEN COUN'rY SITES-STA'l'E WITHDRAWS OFFER TO l'O:SSIBLE ,PURCHASE SITE IN CHATHAM 7 COMBINATION NORTH I MULTIPLE ---~ SOME COUNTIES HEJEC'f CAROLINA 1SITES PLAN-OTHERS ARE NOT UF WAEREN COUN'l'Y AND MULTil-LE SITE PLAN? SITES 6 ACCEPTABLE TO EPA J ~ STATE--. ~SITES -t NONE FOUND -ACCE!'TABLE -iNOT ACTIVELY PURSUED, ALABAMA HIGH TRANSPOR~A~ION COST::.; TREAT IN-PLACE 5 DO NO'l'HING _jEPA REJECTION jOF METHOD 1NOT ACTIVELY l'URSUED AFTER SAMPLING RESULTS 1, SOIL SAMPLING 'l'O DE'rEl{MINE ' PCB CONCENTHATIONS-EFA CONFIRMS APPLICABILITY OF EPA TSCA RULES 2. TESTING OF REMOVAL PROCEDURES J. SITE SELECTION PROCESS 4. PRESENTATION OF CHATHAM AND WARREN COUNTY-PUBLIC HEARINGS AND PERMIT PROCESS 5, STATE PETITIONS El'A FOR AMENDl\-iENT OF RULE '110 ALLOW NEW 'l'HEATMENT METHOD 6. EACH COUNTY IS ASKED TO APPROVE TESTING OF COUN'l1Y LANDFILL 7. WARREN COUN'l'Y SITE PERMI'l1TED BY EPA ..... 0
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THE RESPONSE (cont.)
indicated that he plans to file a civil lawsuit against the acquitted
Raleigh men, directing the Attorney General 1s Office to prepare the suit.
The purpose of this suit would be to recover monetary damages, especially
the clean-up costs which are expected to be millions of dollars.311
Clean-Up Operation (Fig. 1): Two weeks after ~he initial state response,
Governor Hunt announced that the state would remove and bury the
approximately 25,000 cubic yards of contaminated soil in one or more EPA
approved sites at a cost of over two million dollars.W Apparently, this
remained the plan approximately one year later in spite of a series of
suggested alternatives offered in the interim.
Three major alternatives were considered: removal and burial in one
-or more sites in North Carolina approved by EPA, removal and burial in the
closest EPA permitted site (Alabama), or treatment in-place. The Alabama
proposal ·was never seriously considered, however, because of the
prohibitive cost of transporting the contaminated soil. Although there
was mention of exploring the possibility of in-place treatment by
applications of activated carbon as early as August 18,331 it was one
month later when Governor Hunt expressed partiality to the removal
alternative:
... A spokesman for Governor James B. Hunt, Jr., said
today that the Governor has seen nothing to change his
mind about the need to remove the PCB contaminated soil,
although he said the state 11would look at11 other
suggestions ... ~
A site selection process began almost immediately, resulting in the
·ct t. f . t 1 . t . . t t t · 351 cons, era 10n o approx1ma e y nine y sites 1n wen y coun ,es.-
The first step was to conduct a test of procedures to determine if
safe removal was feasible. This was carried out October 5 on an 0.8 mile
stretch of North carolina Highway 58 in Warren County, but not before an
attempt was made by the Warrenton Town Board to block the test. The Town
Board objected to the proposed 11temporary storage site11 , a highway
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THE RESPONSE (cont.)
maintenance shop yard, because of its nearness to the town's water supply,
the lack of a definition of the word "temporary", and finally, because
they were not consulted with by the state.361 A restraining order was
obtained on the eve of the first scheduled test (September 21, 1978),
eventually resulting in the substitution of a more remote privately owned
disposal site before the test would be completed. The test was considered
a success by state officials.371
The second step came in the form of a proposal to locate the first
disposal site in Chatham County. On November 21, 1978, the Chatham County
Board of Commissioners passed a resolution to sell the state six acres of
land at their county landfill for the purpose of permanent storage of PCB
contaminated soii.381 A public hearing on the matter was held December
11, and three to four hundred vehement citizens turned out to oppose the
plan. An editorial from a local newspaper represents the opinion of those
citizens present:
... We would like to make ourselves perfectly clear on
the issue of developing a dump site for PCB in Chatham
County. We are unalterably opposed to any dumping of
PCB in Chatham under any circumstances, period ... Why
are we unalterably opposed to dumping it in Chatham?391 Can't we be persuaded by scientific evidence? No ... -
Many technical questions were raised at the hearing, especially with
regard to the three waivers of EPA regulations requested in the permit
application.401 The account of the hearing indicates that not only was
the state unprepared, but that evidence presented in support of the
disposal site had little impact on the hearing's outcome. Consequently,
on December 15, the state withdrew its offer to purchase, and on December
18, the County Commissioners voted not to sell. On December 28, the state
withdrew its application to EPA for a site permit.
On December 12, the state submitted an application to EPA for
approval of a 142-acre disposal site to be established in Warren County.
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THE RESPONSE (cont.)
The waivers requested and process undertaken followed the same general
outline as for the previous site.411 This site was privately owned,
however; local officials thus, did not possess veto power. Even before
the hearing of January 4, a state official stated that public sentiment
would not deter the state.421 Also, prior to January 4, the Warren County
Board of Commissioners voted to oppose the plan saying it would
jeopardize the poor rural county's natural environment and economic
development.431 At the hearing, public reaction was similar to that
regarding the Chatham County proposal, even though the state was better
prepared to handle the barrage of technical and general inquiries.441
EPA approved the site in June, and it still remains a viable
disposal alternative. Because local public opposition has remained
strong, it is understandable that another proposal surfaced in the
interim.
In February, one rronth after the Warren County hearing, tests were
conducted to judge the feasibility of in-place treatment of the
contaminated soil. At the same time, the state petitioned EPA to amend
40 CFR 761.lO(b) to allow the regional administrators of EPA discretion to
approve additional methods of disposal for soil and debris that have been
contaminated by PCBs as a result of a spill.451 The method, proposed by
Dr. Jerome Weber of North Carolina State University (see Appendix C), was
proclaimed effective by the state, and the Governor announced his support
on April 2.461
A problem arose with the state's plans for in-place treatment when
an EPA study claimed that test animals absorbed a significant amount of
PCB components from the contaminated charcoal in their gastrointestinal
tract.471 On this basis, EPA refused the request to allow in-place
treatment.481 Dr. Weber contended that the decision was political in
nature based on EPA's unwillingness to set a precedent.491 State
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THE RESPONSE (cont.)
officials were privately skeptical of the EPA's test because of necessary
time constraints imposed to allow a relatively rapid response to the
state's petition.
The simultaneous rejection of in-place treatment and acceptance of
the Warren County site forced the state to assume the same position it had
taken almost one year after discovering the initial spill. The state was
faced with the tremendous task of removing hundreds of miles of
contaminated roadside soil.
Awareness that the Warren County alternative was not acceptable to
the local public and in-place treatment was not acceptable to EPA, the
next logical step was to search for a solution which would be acceptable
to both entities. Early indications that in-place treatment would not be
agreeable to EPA had prompted the state to devise an alternate plan. This
plan, to bury the contaminated soil in each county's respective landfill,
became known as the "multiple site plan." The reasoning behind the plan
was two-fold. First, burial was acceptable to EPA, and second, no county
would be importing PCB material.
A number of problems surfaced to halt consideration of the multiple
site plan. Although EPA infonnally had declared eight counties
acceptable, two were clearly not technically feasible,501 and four
counties officially refused to give the state permission to test the soil.
In addition, public interest groups objected, citing the difficulty
involved in monitoring multiple sites.511
The foregoing discussion describes the clean-up operation phases:
site selection, Chatham and Warren County proposals, in-place treatment,
and the multiple site plan. Two years after the initial spill, the PCB
contaminated soil remained in place in spite of considerable activity
aimed at solving the problems it has caused. The following sunmary serves
to briefly outline the roles of the major actors involved in the preceding
THE RESPONSE (cont.)
· timetable of events.
Department of Crime Control and Public Safety
Crime Control's role has basically been that of coordinator, working
with the agencies and acting a~ the official spokesman for the state. In
addition, this department has presided over the public hearings, submitted
applications to EPA, and, at the time of this writing, is in the process
of issuing an Environmental Impact Statement on the Warren County
proposal.
Department of Human Resources
In the site selection process, the Solid Waste and Vector Control
Branch, Sanitary Engineering Section of the Division of Health Services
was the lead agency. The Epidemiology Section continued its function of
checking and testing for health effects and possible contamination of
workers and residents during the clean-up operations.
Department of Transportation
The maintenance section of the Division of Highways had the task of
developing a means by which material could be moved or treated in place.
Employees within the branch have modified equipment and conducted
simulated pick-up operations. When tests for removal and treatment
in-place were actually conducted, DOT personnel performed the work and
provided the equipment.
Environmental Protection Agency
The federal government has played a lead role in the clean-up
operation because TSCA regulates the disposal of PCBs. This agency has
helped the state by monitoring air during clean-up tests and assisting in
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THE RESPONSE (cont.)
the completion of applications for permits.
Local Governments
Local governments have played a role because of the land use problems
involved in disposal. The consideration of county owned landfills gave
county governments veto power over these alternatives. Private land is
subject only to local land use controls. In addition, local governments I
served as a representative of their constituents' opposition to disposal
alternatives within their counties.
PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED
The nature and scope of the incident, the composition of the
substance, the structure of state government, and the absence of a state-
wide toxic substances control program contributed to problems in all
aspects of the response operations. An analysis of the specific problems
encountered in this incident facilitates the fonnulation of
recommendations for changes necessary to adequately deal with similar
situations that may occur in the future.
Emergency Response: Emergency response to chemical dumpings such as this
one requires the rapid completion of three major tasks: identification of
the nature of the problem, identification of optimal actions, and
implementation of these actions. Although the definition of the term
"rapid" may vary from case to case due to the nature of the substance
spilled and the type of spill, it is apparent that emergency response to
the PCB incident was clearly lacking.
One of the factors contributing to the difficulties in a rapid
response was the delineation of the extensive area contaminated. Spread
along hundreds of miles of rural roads, the first spill in Warren County
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PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED (cont.)
may not have been detected so early had it not been for the noxious odor
of the host substance. The problem of delineation of the initial spill
and identification of the contaminant was compounded by the discovery of
additional contaminated areas throughout the state.
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These difficulties suggest that quick identification and adequate
search capacity require the use of statewide personnel including those in
local government. Education concerning the nature of toxic wastes and the
provision of adequate lines of communication are necessary prerequisites
for the rapid response of those individuals. Such lines of coltlllunication
could be established through existing systems, for example the statewide
Police Infonnation Network.
Another factor which contributed to emergency response problems was
the chemical properties of the substance. A lack of infonnation
concerning this chemical contributed directly to the delay in forniulating
the optimal actions necessary to minimize the hazards of the spills. The
time consumed by a nationwide search for information directly influenced
events occurring duringthe first few days of governmental response,
including conflicting instructions coming from two state agencies and
indecision concerning the necessary monitoring of the area environment and
residents.521
This lack of infonnation points to the need for a centralized
location in the state capitol to contain available information on
hazardous materials. In addition, a determination of an appropriate
response to the spillage of hazardous materials should be made prior to
the occurrence of spills as a precautionary measure, recognizing that
various spill situations may necessitate revision of the responses.
The final factor that contributed to the problems of emergency
response was the structure of state government. Fragmentation of
responsibilities is a necessary characteristic of state government. A
.......
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PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED (cont.)
toxic chemical spill has a multitude of ramifications which clearly
traverse the ordinary divisions of a government. When several agencies
must act in a similar time-frame in response to a single incident, as was
the case in the PCB incident, coordination is of major concern.531
There are two possible solutions to a coordination problem of this
type and both are appropriate recommendations in this case. First, the
elimination of duplication of agency responsibilities is essential. A
prime example of this duplication of agency responsibility is DNRCD with
regard to hazardous substance spills under the State Oil and Hazardous
Substances Control Act and the responsibility of OHR with regard to
imminent hazards under the hazardous waste portion of the State Solid
Waste Management Act.54/
Second, the designation of a lead agency to coordinate the action of
other involved agencies is essential. Although this action did not take
place until approximately one month after the initial spill was
discovered, the state's recognition of this need resulted in the
designation of the Department of Crime Control and Public Safety. The
status of this agency with regard to toxic substance spills was made
permanent by enactment of Article 13 of Chapter 113A of the North Carolina
Statutes in the 1979 General Assembly. G.S. 113A-203 states that the
Department of Crime Control and Public Safety shall coordinate the initial
response of state agencies to toxic substance incidents.
Enforcement Response: The primary objectives of enforcement response to
an intentional discharge of toxic material are to apprehend and
successfully prosecute those responsible. In this case, those responsible
were apprehended, but prosecution was not completely successful. A
significant factor contributing to this situation was the absence of a
statute which clearly prohibited the activity in question. As a result,
the charges were derived from the series of incidentally related statutes
19
PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED (cont.)
previously mentioned.
The obvious response to this problem is the enaction of appropriate
legislation. The 1979 General Assembly produced a flurry of statutes in
the toxic material area. While this legislation may prove adequate, it
has not been tested in the courts with regard to liability standards, the
amount and type of penalties, and the definition of hazardous substances.
The enaction of statutes does not eliminate the need for
administrative action. During the enforcement phase of the PCB incident,
several questions were raised. When should the SBI be drawn into the
investigation of such incidents? When should criminal rather than civil
penalties be pursued? Should the state or the federal government take the
lead role in prosecution? For each of these questions it is clear that
administrative guidelines are needed to direct future enforcement actions
of this type.
Another factor which contributed to enforcement problems is the lack
of criminal investigators trained in the area of toxic substance
discharges. This type of dumping is a relatively new and increasingly
significant area of criminal activity.551 Traditional law enforcement
agencies have not adjusted to the new demands this area may place upon
them. Additional training to cover the special characteristics of such
dumpings is desirable.
Finally, it was previously mentioned that the final stage of
prosecution in this case will be an attempt to recover the cost of
cleaning up the contaminated soil. Although this stage has not been
initiated at the time of this writing, we can conjecture that the state
may face difficulties with this course of action. Basically, there is no
indication that the persons charged with the crime possess the resources
necessary to pay for the clean-up operation. The PCB incident makes it
evident that a small operator can inflict large damages. Legislative
WA&4! w , o.;z: ,,...vs::ue:pu:s a .. ~ .. z _ ., cm ""@WlWW:-t .. W9fW .,AtCCAOU •. G .D _X Q . WAP ·tC.b ◄:"'-"P"•..._...,.f'~O:--~~•--; ... , •t.fi•.-~--
PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED (cont.)
changes are necessary to ensure the financial responsibility of toxic
material handlers within the state.561
20
Clean-Up Operation: The state has been unable to find a disposal
alternative that is acceptable technically, financially, and politically.
Thus, two years after the incident occurred, the material remained on the
ground where it was dumped. As in the case of the other response
operations, several factors have contributed to this situation:
1. The state lacks a hazardous waste landfill. The absence of a
site not only increases transportation costs to the nearest
disposal facility, but encourages dumping because of the lack of
economically feasible alternatives. Therefore, the development
of a hazardous waste landfill within the state would make a site
available for clean-up operations for the PCB contaminated soil
and reduce the need for such clean-up operations in the future.
2. The problem was intensified by the uncertainty associated with
disposal alternatives including both in-place treatment and the
adequacy of proposed sites. The infonnation necessary to defend
the safety of a proposed action should be gathered before the
formal announcement of a decision.
3. Closely associated with the preceding factor is the EPA's
inability to investigate all feasible methods of disposal before
imposing regulations. Whether EPA 's response to in-place
treatment was a result of purely technical considerations or
inflexibility in guidelines and standards remains unknown.
However, to avoid future difficulties in this area, EPA should
evaluate all feasible methods of disposal before imposing
regulations, and should continue to reevaluate these regulations
within the context of newly developed procedures.
21
PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED (cont.)
4. There was a lack of coordination from the state to the local
level during the state's investigation of disposal sites within a
particular area. Public officials and local citizens continually
complained that they had not learned of site proposals until
plans were announced in the newspaper. An effort should be made
to consult with local government officials and area residents
early in the site selection process.
5. Finally, even with local participation, there is apparently no
assurance of success in completing the siting process. The
characteristics of a hazardous waste disposal site dictate that
the risks from such a site be concentrated in a small area, while
the benefits are spread over all areas serviced by such a site.
This inequitable distribution of risks and benefits intensifies
local opposition from both the residents and governmental
officials.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The 1978 dumping of polychlorinated biphenyls along approximately
210 miles of North Carolina highways has resulted in the direct
involvement of a number of agencies at all levels of the government.
The actions taken by these agencies were directed toward the three
major goals of emergency response, enforcement, and clean-up. Within
each operation there was a multitude of activities including monitoring,
testing, public hearings, media use, permit applications, grant
applications, investigations, and prosecution.
An examination of the various governmental actions provides the
necessary background information for an analysis of the problems
encountered. Central to this issue is the inadequate structure of the
government as related to its preparedness and ability to effectively
I I
I I i
-
Db trt SE
22
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS (cont.)
deal with the PCB incident. The result indicates that major problem areas
exist with respect to response capability and intergovernmental relations.
Specific factors contributing to each of the preceding problems include:
a lack of information concerning toxic chemicals, unclear role
descriptions for the major agencies involved, failure of governmental
regulations to consider highly variable situations, and a lack of public
integration into the clean-up operation.
The series of events and the problems encountered during this
specific incident illustrate the common problems possible with the range
of toxic chemicals becoming more and more prevalent in today's society.
Although additional difficulties are foreseeable, they could perhaps be
minimized through the correction of the inadequacies highlighted in this
case study.
ENDNOTES
1. North Carolina Department of Crime Control and Public Safety,
Administrative Action Draft Negative Declaration in Compliance with
the North Carolina Environmental Policy Act, "Removal and Disposal
of Soil Contaminated With PCB's Along Highway Shoulders in North
Carolina", December, 1978.
2. North Carolina Highway 58, occurring on July 27 and July 29 (19.25
shoulder miles).
23
3. North Carolina Department of Crime Control and Public Safety. North
Carolina Oil Pollution Control Law, G.S. 143-215.77 et seq.
4. North Carolina Department of Crime Control and Public Safety.
5. Ibid.
6. "PCB Dumpers Thought to be Out-of-Staters", The News and Observer,
August 10, 1978; The decision to involve the SBI was made by the
Secretary of the Department of Natural Resources and Community
Development.
7. United States Environmental Protection Agency, "Fact Sheet of
Polychlorinated Biphenyls", undated.
8. National Research Council, Polychlorinated Biphenyls, 1979.
9. United States Environmental Protection Agency.
10. Public Law 94-469, October 11, 1976, 15 USC 2605(e).
11. Ibid.
12. North Carolina Oil Pollution Control Law, G.S. 143-215.77 et seq.
In the 1979 session of the General Assembly the statute was amended
to include a section on hazardous substances, 1979 Session Laws,
Chapter 535.
13. North Carolina Department of Natural Resources and Community
Development, News Release, August 4, 1978.
14. "PCBs Won't Just Go Away", The News and Observer, August 13, 1978.
The effects of these vapors were temporary and did not concern state
health officials.
15. Department of Crime Control and Public Safety, "Events Surrounding
PCB Problem", undated.
16. "State's Response Irks Benson Man", The Raleigh Times, August 12,
1978.
17. See Appendix 8.
18. "State to Move, Bury PCB Soil", The Raleigh Times, August 17, 1978.
.,. 24
ENDNOTES (cont.)
19. "Tests for PCB Exposure Inconclusive", The Raleigh Times, August 22,
1978:
... Maccormack said state physicians tested eleven Johnson
County residents who live along roads where PCBs were
dumped earlier this month. State physicians also tested
nine people who aren't suspected of PCB exposure. The
latter served as a scientific control group ....
20. "Tobacco Near PCB Spills to be Tested for Hazards", The Raleigh
Times, August 18, 1978.
21. From interviews with Dr. Martin P. Hines, Chief, Epidemiology
Section, Division of Health Services, Department of Human Resources
and Or. William Y. Cobb, Director, Division of Food and Drug
Protection, Office of Consumer Services, Department of Agriculture,
July 11, 1979.
22. The Raleigh Times, August 17, 1978.
23. "State Will Dig Up PCB Contamination", The Smithfield Herald, August
18, 1978:
... The Governor has asked President Carter for federal
aid. Mr. George said the best possibility of aid at this
point is the federal Highway Emergency Assistance Fund ....
24 . The Raleigh Times, August 17, 1978.
25. North Carolina Department of Natural Resources and Community
Development.
26. This soil occurred in Kernersville, North Carolina in June 1977.
27. Indictment, State of North Carolina, County of Halifax, August 28,
1978.
28. "Three Enter Guilty Pleas in PCB Trial", The News and Observer,
June 5, 1979.
29. "PCB Charges Spread to Raleigh", The News and Observer, January 23,
1979.
30. "Charges Against 1 Dropped in PCB Trial", June 8, 1979; "Raleigh
Man is Acquitted in PCB Case", The News and Observer, June 13, 1979.
31. "State Plans Civil Lawsuit in PCB Dumping", The News and Observer,
June 14, 1979.
32. The Raleigh Times, August 17, 1978.
33. "Officials Perplexed About PCB Problem", The Reidsville Review,
August 18, 1978, For description of in-place treatment see Appendix
C.
34. "State Still Stumped by PCB Clean-Up", The Raleigh Times, September
15, 1978.
••. ...._._,, . .-..,_~--.....,.., ....... ..._ .. __ ,=--~ ·-------►e....-••-... ~~-~~:e:tKi,,t ditz! ~Stift ·► e±ttit:iJ itbr «· t'Jitdi -f I •a 1 "bt##lf« . Q ,, .. H'ftaiz ·ri•tm ••~._
35.
36.
37.
38.
39 .
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
25
ENDNOTES (cont.)
North Carolina Department of Crime Control and Public Safety.
"Warrenton to Fight State's PCB Test Plan", The News and Observer,
September 20, 1978.
Department of Crime Contro 1 and Public Safety, news release, November
6, 1978.
Department of Crime Control and Public Safety, news release, November
21, 1978.
"We Are Una 1 terab ly Opposed to a PCB Dump Site in Chatham, Period",
editorial, The Chatham County Herald, December 6, 1978.
The waivers requested were for the artificial liner requirement
(reasoning-one time operation, larger clay liner, and hyperlon
liner), fifty foot separation between the site and groundwater
requirement (reasoning-larger clay liner and absence of low water
table in North Carolina Piedmont area), and requirement for leachate
collection system under liner (reasoning-collection system on top
of liner and hyperlon liner); A Department of Crime Control and
Public Safety official emphasized that no site had been permitted by
EPA ever without a waiver, and that EPA personnel had practically
filled out the permit application in their aid to the state,
"Application to U.S. EPA Region IV for PCB Disposal Site, Chatham
County, North Carolina", by the State of North Carolina, December 6,
1978.
North Carolina Department of Crime Control and Public Safety.
"Warren County Site Eyed as PCB Burial Ground", The News and
Observer, December 21, 1978.
"State in Face-Off Against Warren Over PCB", The News and Observer,
January 4, 1979.
Department of Crime Control and Public Safety", "Written and Oral
Questions Raised at the Public Hearing on PCB Storage in Warren
County Held at Warrenton on January 4, 1979; Questions Contained in
the Transcript of That Proceeding: And Answers to Those Questions",
January 16, 1979.
State of North Carolina, "Petition for Amendment of a Rule Under
TOSCA11 , February 2, 1979.
"Carbon Treatment of PCB Preferred", The News and Observer, April 3,
1979.
Charles, Farmer, and Johnson, 11 Pharmacokinetic Studies on the
Disavailability of the Tank-PCB Sample Absorbed on Activated
Charcoal", Environmental Toxicology Division, Health Effects Research
Laboratory, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, undated.
"EPA Opposes North Carolina Plan for PCB Treatment", The Washington
Post, June 5, 1979.
· A • : rf r e 11w-
ENDNOTES (cont.)
49. "PCB Decision Political, Teacher Says", The News and Observer, June
7, 1979.
50. 11 EPA OKs Eight Dumps for PCB Soil", The News and Observer, July 26,
1979.
51. "Putting PCB in Landfills is Risky, Groups Contend", The News and.
Observer, June 21, 1979.
26
52 .... 'At a press conference Wednesday, the state's Chief Epidermologist
(sic), Martin P. Hines, said the state had no plans to do a health
survey in the contaminated areas because "we don't believe there's an
unnecessary hazard to anyone"' ... , The Raleigh Times, August 12,
1978.
53. Interviews with state officials indicated clearly that coordination
was a major problem in the early response to the incident, Martin
Hines and William Cobb.
54. DNRCD, under Article 21A of Chapter 143 of the North Carolina General
Statutes, has jurisdiction over spills of substances designated as
hazardous by EPA; OHR, under Article 13B of Chapter 130 of the North
Carolina Statutes, can declare an imminent hazard if it determines
that the handling of a hazardous waste constitutes a danger to the
public. If a substance involved in an incident is both a hazardous
substance and a hazardous waste under the two respective statutes,
both agencies may have jurisdiction over the same incident .
55. Statement of James W. Moorman, Assistant Attorney General, Land and
Natural Resources Division of the U.S. Department of Justice, Third
Toxic Substances Control Conference, December 5, 1978.
56. The hazardous waste program being implemented under the State Solid
Waste Management Act (Chapter 130, Article 13B, North Carolina
Statutes) will have insurance requirements for handlers of hazardous
waste. However, this statute does not control substances which are
not wastes.
,, .
• •···· " o~ .... -
APPENDIX A .
From Negative EIS Declaration
' .,, :.,...
LOCATION MAP
Pee ·· SPILLS
i
-
c..
\
Ill. --·-~.,.... .. ·-----------'
1 l i
JAMU ■. HUNT, JR. aovraNOJI
SAIIAH T. MORROW. M .D .. M .~.H.
■IC:Jtll'TA,tY
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES
Division of Health Services
P. 0. Box 2091 Raleigh 27602
TO: North Carolina Citizens Living on Roads Where PCBs Were Dumped
IMPORTANT INFORMATION ON PCBs
APPENDIX B
HUGH H . TILSON, M .0 .
0UtS:CTOIII
There has been much concern recently about the criminal dumping of PCBs
(Polychlorinated biphenyls) along North Carolina's roads. The purpose of this
memorandum is to present the facts about this situation from a health stand-
point.
WHAT ARE PCBs?: PCBs are a group or class of chemicals which have been used
widely in industry since the early 1940's. These oily liquids have served as
agents in electrical equipment and in many other industrial situations. They
do not tend to break down very easily over time. Unfortunately, they have
found their way into the environment down through the years so that fish,
wildlife, domestic animals, and many humans now carry very small amounts of
PCBs in their bodies.
In complicated matters, PCBs are usually mixed with other chemicals
before being used in industry. Durning use, there is some breakdown of these
chemicals (including the PCBs) similar to the changes that occur in motor oil
in an automobile with use.
WHAT ARE THEIR EFFECTS ON HUMANS? : There is no irrmediate threat to the health
of anyone living in the area of these PCB spills. In the few situations where
humans have been poisoned by these chemicals, the chemicals were taken into
the body either by swallowing large amounts or by getting large arrounts on the
skin over a period of time, as in people working in factories using PCBs to
manufacture electrical equipment.
The other chemicals besides PCBs in the oily substance spilled on the
roadway might cause minor temporary irritations to eyes and throat, and might
cause nausea in those smelling these chemicals irrmediately after the spill.
These are temporary symptoms that should disappear in a day or two. They do
not cause permanent ill effects.
IS IT DANGEROUS TO WALK WHERE PCBs HAVE BEEN SPILLED? : While there is likely
no danger from occasionally walking through these oily spill areas (either
barefoot or in shoes), because of the small exposure that would occur, we
believe it is wise to avoid these areas unless it is absolutely necessary. If
you walk through one of these areas and note an oily substance on your feet or
shoes, it should be washed off with soap and water. Contaminated clothing
should not be worn until thoroughly washed.
...
APPENDIX B (cont.)
-2-
To assure people that the risk of exposure is negligible, the Division of
Health Services is conducting a small study of PCB levels in selected
individuals who have had the heaviest exposure to these spills.
ARE WELLS, VEGETABLE GARDENS, LIVESTOCK, AND PETS LIKELY TO BE CONTAMINATED
WITH PCBs? : PCBs, like other oils, are only slightly soluble in water. Also,
they are tightly bound in soil particles where they are deposited, and thus,
do not move great distances in the soil quickly. It is extremely unlike1y
that residues from these spills will find their way into wells. However, we
are checking well water for PCBs where wells are located within just a few
feet of the spills. So far, results on this testing have been negative.
Livestock should not be allowed to graze on the spill areas. Some of the
grass growing by the roadways is contaminated with PCBs. Pets should also be
kept out of these areas. PCBs from these spills would be unlikely to
contaminate pastures or gardens unless there was inmediate run-off at the time
of the spill before soaking into the ground or heavy erosion. If this has
occurred, do not allow animals to graze in these areas, and do not eat
vegetables from contaminated areas.
REMEMBER
(1) There is no immediate danger to anyone's health.
(2) Avoid, as much as possible, walking in the spill areas.
(3) If you do feel you have had PCB exposure to any part of your body,
wash with soap and water as soon as possible.
(4) If you feel you have had unusual excessive exposure to PCBs, contact
your physician.
, ..... "-·
..
APPENDIX C
PCB IN-PLACE TREATMENT
PROPOSED BY
Dr. Jerome B. Weber
Crop Sciences Department
North Carolina State University
Corrrnercial fertilizer in amounts of 500 lbs/acre of 10-10-10 be applied,
along with limestone at 1 ton/acre, to the PCB contaminated soil. A
power-driven rotary hoe be used to soil incorporate the fertilizer,
limestone, and carbon-inactivated PCB into the soil to a depth of 3 inches.
(An abundant supply of activated carbon has already been applied, but
some may feel that more should be added. This could be done.) 1" of
virgin soil would then be spread over ·the area.
After thorough incorporation of the soil amendments, and the carbon and
PCB, the soil should be seeded with fescue, cultipacked and sprayed with
the erosion control materials routinely used by the Department of
Transportation. Once the fescue has emerged and grown to a height of
approximately 3 inches, it should be sampled and analyzed for PCB to con-
firm that PCB is firmly fixed in the pores of the activated carbon. The
fescue plants should be monitored over a long period of time to be sure
that no detectable levels of PCB or their metabolites are getting into
the plants. Likewise, the soil should be monitored to examine the PCB
and metabolite levels over a long period of time. Activated carbon will
greatly decrease the longevity of PCB, but enzymes produced by soil
microorganisms will slowly find their way into the carbon pores and degrade
some of the PCB's. The addition of fertilizer and limestone will insure
a good growth of fescue and may encourage microbial breakdown of the
PCB's. Activated carbon present in the soil will probably also absorb
PCB metabolites which are formed, so it is unlikely that these will be
taken up by the fescue. However, the continued monitoring of plant and
soil samples is a must. ·