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HomeMy WebLinkAboutAQ_F_0100237_20130306_CMPL_Fac-Ltr Canfor Southern Pine CANF(#)R New South Lumber Co.,Inc. March 6, 2013 Mr. Alan Drake ; Division of Air Quality,Technical Services Section �. f NC Department of Environment and Natural Resources i 1641 Mail Service Center MAR 8 2013 Raleigh,North Carolina 27699-1641 Re: New South Lumber Co.,Inc. —Graham Plant Facility ID No 0100237 Air Permit No. 06740T17 Review of COM System Performance Letter Dated February 12,2013 Mr. Drake, We have received and reviewed your letter dated February 12, 2013 summarizing your review of the second semi- annual report submitted by the New South—Graham facility on January 21, 2013. The objective of this letter is to address the potential violation raised in your review letter. As you know,the equipment of concern is Boiler#4(ID B-4), a 57.6 MMBtu/hr, wood-fired boiler equipped with two (2)multiclones and an electrostatic precipitator(ESP), all in series. The boiler was installed in September 2007 and began operation in December 2007. Based on its installation/construction date,B-4 is subject to particulate matter and visible emissions limitations under the New Source Performance Standards (NSPS), Subpart Dc. In particular,NSPS Subpart Dc requires the facility to limit visible emissions from B-4 to<20%opacity (40CFR60.43c(c)) and particulate matter emissions to<0.030 lb/MMBtu (40CFR60.43c(e)(1)). NSPS Subpart Dc establishes a preferred monitoring approach that relies upon using a Continuous Opacity Monitor (COM)to demonstrate ongoing compliance with the particulate matter and visible emissions limits (40CFR60.47c(a)). The New South—Graham facility completed initial setup and performance certification of the B-4 COM system on December 18, 2007. Since that time and through to June 2012, the facility has had 0.0% monitor downtime for 16 of 18 calendar quarters, with only two (2) quarters where any portion of the COM system malfunctioned or was unavailable during operation of the boiler. In the first incident, during the second quarter of 2010, the laser mirror associated with the COM became obscured during a period of heavy rain. Based on instruction provided by the COM equipment supplier(Teledyne),the mirror could not be cleaned or re-aligned until dry weather. Once ambient conditions improved, facility personnel cleaned and re-aligned the mirror and proper operation of the COM resumed. Total monitor downtime associated with this incident was 2.38% that quarter,with both the cause of the malfunction and the duration of the downtime attributed wholly to weather conditions. The second incident, during the second quarter of 2011, was also caused by moisture condensing on the laser mirror in the stack during heavy rainfall and was addressed by facility personnel as soon as ambient conditions improved. This incident led to monitor downtime of 0.14% for the quarter. Looking at overall operation of the Graham Plant 4408 Mt. Hermon-Rock Creek Road, Graham, North Carolina, U.S.A. 27253 Telephone (336) 376-3130 Fax (336) 376-8403 Mr. Alan Drake March 6,2013 Page 2 equipment,the New South—Graham facility had a data capture rate of 99.83%for the first 4.5 years operation of the COM. Furthermore,the limited monitor downtime in this time period was fully attributed to weather conditions. In the 3rd quarter of 2012, the facility experienced an electrical malfunction that interrupted communication between the COM system at the stack and the data acquisition system(DAS)used to analyze the COM readings to generate 6-minute averages and record the results. The malfunction first appeared on 07/16/2012 as an error code(-999)on the remote COM readout associated with the data acquisition system. The malfunction initially lasted approximately 3 hours,during which time site personnel checked and tightened the electrical connections between the COM system at the stack and the remote COM/DAS in the control room. Normal function of the data acquisition system resumed, and the facility believed the problem to be addressed. Three days later,near midnight on Thursday, 07/19/2012, the error code(-999)reappeared on the remote COM panel and information transfer to the data acquisition system was interrupted. The COM analyzer on the stack continued to function properly and provide instantaneous readings,which were monitored by facility personnel. The facility followed the troubleshooting procedures established and approved in its Opacity Monitoring Plan. When the problem was not resolved by the next afternoon,the facility contacted the COM manufacturer(Teledyne) for support. The Teledyne support personnel agreed with the troubleshooting efforts taken by the site and suggested as a next step complete replacement of the electrical cable running from the COM analyzer on the stack to the remote COMMAS unit in the control room. The facility has a local supplier for this electrical cable; however, the supplier did not have a single cable of adequate length(400 ft.) in stock to meet this need. Splicing together multiple lengths of shorter cable would potentially decrease signal quality and increase sensitivity of the system to moisture. A spool of cable was ordered and arrived the next business day(Monday, 07/23/2012); however,heavy rainfall prevented installation of the new cable until Tuesday, 07/24/2012. Proper data capture resumed upon completion of the cable replacement effort and once again,the facility believed the problem to be addressed. However,the error code and associated data capture problems re-appeared near midnight on Friday, 07/27/2012. The facility resumed troubleshooting efforts,but the remote COM/DAS resumed normal operation without intervention on Monday morning, 07/30/2012. During this period,the stack COM continued to function properly, and the facility checked those instantaneous readings frequently to confirm visual observations that boiler visible emissions were negligible(<4% opacity). The COM/DAS functioned properly for the next 16 days. Then,near midnight on Thursday, 08/16/2012,the error code(-999)reappeared on the remote COM/DAS in the control room. As in the past, the stack COM continued to function properly and provide instantaneous opacity readings. The facility started over with troubleshooting the entire system. After checking/testing the entire system from detector to DAS and eliminating problems in each of these areas, the facility concluded, in consultation with the COM manufacturer, that the problem must reside inside a sealed circuitry panel on the stack COM unit. This panel is normally kept sealed to avoid moisture intrusion to the sensitive electronic components. No routine maintenance is recommended for components inside this panel, and problems are not normally experienced with these parts. However, after eliminating all other potential causes for the communication error,Teledyne support personnel instructed facility personnel to open the sealed panel (under dry, ambient conditions) and remove the printed circuit boards. Each circuit board was inspected and the connections were cleaned prior to re-insertion. After cleaning and returning the circuit boards,the panel was re-sealed and the COM system Mr. Alan Drake March 6,2013 Page 3 restarted. Proper operation of the COM/DAS resumed on Thursday, 08/30/2012. No further problems with the remote COMMAS have been observed since this time. Monitor downtime for the 4th quarter of 2012 was 0.0%. The DAS was unable to collect valid opacity data for approximately 570 hours in the Yd quarter of 2012 due to this exceptional electronic communication malfunction. The COM itself continued to work properly throughout the malfunction,providing instantaneous visible emissions readings at the stack. Facility personnel monitored these instantaneous readings periodically during each period of lost communication. Based on those instantaneous readings and frequent visual observations of the emission point, boiler stack opacity remained below 5% throughout this time period. In addition,the boiler control panel is equipped with numerous alarms to notify operators of the most-likely upset conditions on the boiler or the ESP. None of these alarms were activated during this period of improper data communication between the COM system and the data acquisition system. There is no indication of boiler or ESP malfunction,nor any other reason to suspect an emissions exceedance during this time period. As such, we believe there was no harm to the environment associated with the electrical malfunction and lost data capture. The facility has an outstanding history of compliance and successful operation of this monitoring system. Even with this extended malfunction,the facility has achieved 98.4%data capture from the COM in the 5 years it has operated. We hope the Department will consider this excellent performance record in its evaluation of this particular incident. We also believe it is important to look at the situation in the context of the specific regulation. As stated earlier,use of a COM is certainly the preferred method of compliance monitoring under NSPS Subpart De. However, the regulation does allow certain boiler operators to conduct Method 9 visible emissions tests in lieu of installation and use of a COM(40CFR60.47c(a) and(f))—including those with wood-fired boilers equipped with ESP particulate matter control. Numerous conditions affect the frequency of required Method 9 observations; however,under no circumstance does the regulation require Method 9 observations any more frequently than once every 45 days. While we understand that our current permit is not written to make use of this alternative method of monitoring compliance, we believe it provides a valuable point of comparison when considering the impact of the DAS malfunction discussed above. The entire period of concern, starting from the first error message on 07/16/12 to final resolution of the problem on 08/30/12,took place in 45 days. During that time,numerous periods of normal COM/DAS function occurred allowing normal data capture and instantaneous COM readings were available throughout. We have instituted several procedural changes in response to this incident. In the future,if the DAS loses contact with the COM, facility operators will maintain manual,hand-written logs of the instantaneous COM readings throughout the period of DAS malfunction. Readings will be taken on an hourly basis during boiler operation until normal DAS function is restored. In addition, facility personnel will seek input from the COM manufacturer for any COMMAS malfunction that is not resolved within 24 hours. We have also arranged to have a member of our boiler supervisory staff attend smoke school. We believe this will enhance our ability to monitor overall boiler operations, regardless of COM/DAS performance. We strive to maintain compliance with regulatory obligations at all times, and attempt to go beyond the minimum whenever possible. In keeping with this philosophy, facility management encourages a Mr. Alan Drake March 6, 2013 Page 4 proactive schedule of preventive maintenance for all equipment at the mill and provides extensive training to both operations and maintenance personnel to enhance operation of the facility. We believe our response to this malfunction was reasonable, especially in the context of our performance history with the equipment in question and the alternative compliance monitoring options allowed in the applicable regulation. In addition,the incident did not impair performance of the boiler or control device or otherwise cause harm to the environment. Please let us know if you have any additional questions concerning this incident or the actions we have taken to prevent a recurrence. We would be happy to meet with you and discuss the situation in person. Thanks again for your time. Sincerely, c Ishop General Manager Attachment c: Margaret Love/WSRO Michael Pjetraj/RCO Debbie Sand/New South Kathy Ferry/KJF Consulting